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Act now, act now, and receive as our gift, our gift to you 
They come in all colors, one size fits all 
No muss, no fuss, no spills, you’re tired of kitchen drudgery 
Everything must go, going out of business, going out of business 
Going out of business sale 
Fifty percent off original retail price, skip the middle man 
Don’t settle for less.1 
 
[S]upport for WSUI comes from Kentucky Fried Chicken, near the corner 
of Highway 1 West and Riverside Drive in Iowa City, joining others in 
support of WSUI and KSUI public radio. KFC of Iowa City: family owned 
since 1960.2 
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INTRODUCTION 
One fine day in 1991, a small band of idealistic IRS auditors and regulators set out 
to defend the public fisc, the integrity of the tax system, competitive markets, and the 
soul of the American nonprofit sector by taxing the sponsorship revenues of college 
football and the Atlanta Olympics. Arrayed against the IRS were the combined 
lobbying forces of college football, the Atlanta Olympics, the American Heart 
Association, public broadcasting, and thousands of America’s favorite institutions. 
Guess who won. 
This is the standard story of the sponsorship battles in the early 1990s that ended 
with the exemption of charities’3 commercial sponsorship income from the “unrelated 
business income tax” (UBIT) that might otherwise apply.4 In this story, cynical 
charities, corrupted by corporate advertising money, deployed unprincipled political 
muscle to overwhelm the integrity of the tax system and sully American philanthropy 
with unchecked commercialism. Like many conventional stories, this one contains 
substantial truth. Frequent repetition, however, hides unanswered questions. 
At the center of the controversy was the characterization of payments businesses 
make to charities on condition of public recognition. Charities characterized these 
                                                                                                                 
 
 3. This article uses “charity” as shorthand for organizations exempt from federal income 
taxation under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Some of the rules I discuss also apply to other exempt 
organizations, but the controversy over sponsorships revolved around organizations exempt 
under Section 501(c)(3). It is important to emphasize that I intend the word to include all of the 
activities that we implicitly choose to subsidize with the tax exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), 
although many people would not include all of these activities in their colloquial understanding 
of the word “charity.” For further discussion of this disconnect between the extent of Section 
501(c)(3) and colloquial understandings of “charity,” see infra note 6. All references in this 
article to sections of the “Code” and the “I.R.C.” refer to sections of Title 26 of the United 
States Code (2006), and all references in this article to sections of the “Regulations” or “Treas. 
Reg.” refer to sections of Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 
 4. See, e.g., Frances R. Hill, Corporate Sponsorship in Transactional Perspective: 
General Principles and Special Cases in the Law of Tax Exempt Organizations, 13 U. MIAMI 
ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 5 (1995); Nancy J. Knauer, How Charitable Organizations Influence 
Federal Tax Policy: “Rent-Seeking” Charities or Virtuous Politicians?, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 971, 
1021–31 (1996) [hereinafter Knauer, Influence]; Lee A. Sheppard, The Goldberg Variations, 
or: Giving Away the Store, 58 TAX NOTES 530 (1993); Nathan Wirtschafter, Note and Comment, 
Fourth Quarter Choke: How the IRS Blew the Corporate Sponsorship Game, 27 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1465 (1994). 
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payments as charitable donations (exempt from tax) for which the donor was simply 
thanked publicly. The IRS attacked them as barely disguised ad buys, resulting in 
taxable business income. 
Underlying these claims, as well as the legislation that ended the controversy, was 
an unexamined assumption that there was an important distinction between providing a 
charitable donor with public recognition and providing a business with advertising 
services. This assumption was so deeply ingrained that it tempted the IRS into two 
losing battles and also held the charities back from total victory. 
In this article, I examine this assumption critically for the first time, seeking not 
only to explain what happened in the 1990s, but also to use it to explain the political 
dynamics of the charitable exemption and the odd tax that protects it. I draw on several 
decades of academic marketing literature that all sides of the debate have hitherto 
ignored, to elucidate the conceptual distinction between selling sponsorships and 
selling advertising—between leasing halos and billboards. 
This distinction is the key to understanding the sponsorship controversy, the 
legislation that ended it, and the instability of that solution. The distinction is important 
because advertising and sponsor acknowledgement, although both forms of commercial 
communication, have opposite symbolic meanings in the context of the exemption. 
Advertising is the kind of uncharitylike activity the UBIT is designed to deter. Sponsor 
acknowledgement, by contrast, is premised on creating a perception of genuine support 
for the sponsored event or organization. In the symbolic politics of the exemption, this 
perception of genuine support is a good substitute for the real thing. Any attempt to 
deter it with the UBIT, no matter how well-grounded in preexisting doctrine, was 
destined to political failure. Viewed in light of the distinction between advertising and 
sponsor acknowledgement, the IRS did not start in the right, nor did it cravenly 
abandon its post. Rather, it made an early mistake and quickly reconceptualized the 
problem. 
This reconceptualization lead to a practical problem: while the conceptual 
distinction between advertising and sponsor acknowledgement is clear, it is not a 
practical way to sort real arrangements, all of which contain a mix of both. The end 
result had to be a legislative rule that would avoid this ambiguity. At the charities’ 
urging, Congress passed a rule that retained only a symbolic tax on advertising. As I 
will discuss below, this was a politically unstable choice. I discuss the outlines of a 
more stable safe-harbor rule. 
First, a caution. Most writing about the charitable exemption has a strong normative 
quality. People feel strongly about charities. Those strong feelings are what prompt 
many authors to write. They want to support institutions they love, to tear the cloak of 
saintliness from unworthy pretenders, or simply to suggest reforms that might bring the 
reality of charity closer to authors’ high ideals. 
I share these emotions and sympathize with the normative goals they inspire. But 
that is not my project here. I have tried to write not from my emotional perceptions of 
charities but about those perceptions and their influence on the politics and law of the 
charitable tax exemption. This is crucial to understanding the charitable tax exemption 
because, as I have demonstrated elsewhere, the exemption does not reflect instrumental 
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legislative policy.5 The exemption is not a deliberate or even an intuitive attempt to 
achieve some economic or social goal, such as a horizontally fair tax system or an 
optimal level of public goods. Rather, it is chiefly an exercise in symbolic politics—a 
mechanism for expressing and perpetuating cultural perceptions about charities. My 
project in this article is to describe the possibly unstable place of sponsorship and 
advertising in this political mechanism. Accordingly, I do not praise or condemn the 
end result of that mechanism—the broad tax subsidization of charities. For the same 
reasons, I also do not address whether the exemption covers a broader set of 
organizations than it should.6 Both of these topics are worthy of thought, but they are 
simply not the issue here. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 5. See Ethan G. Stone, Adhering to the Old Line: Uncovering the History and Political 
Function of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 54 EMORY L.J. 1475, 1480–81 (2005). For 
further discussion, see infra text accompanying note 19. 
 6. Many observers’ discomfort in the 1990s may also have reflected an underlying 
unhappiness with the scope of the exemption. Many of the critics of the college bowls and the 
1993 Regulations seem to have been motivated to a significant degree by a feeling that popular 
sports events were outside the realm of “good works” properly subsidized by the exemption. 
See, e.g., Cynthia G. Farbman, Forced to Be a Fan: An Analysis and History of the IRS’s 
Proposed Regulations Regarding Corporate Sponsorship, 2 SPORTS L.J. 53, 53 (1995) 
(“College football has become increasingly commercialized. It is seldom played for the Olympic 
ideal that sports should be played by amateur athletes for the sheer love of the game. Some 
athletes might be playing for the love of the game, but it is likely that the schools’ motives are 
less altruistic.”) (internal quotations omitted); Amy Forsythe, Implications of the Cotton Bowl 
Ruling on the Exempt Status of Intercollegiate Athletic Organizations, 6 EXEMPT ORG. TAX 
REV. 933, 933 (1992) (proposing the IRS challenge exempt status of bowl organizations rather 
than challenging sponsorship revenues under UBIT); Paul Streckfus, Editor’s Notebook, 9 
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 161, 162 (1994) (placing quotation marks around “charities” in 
referring to the Mobil Cotton Bowl Athletic Association and other college bowl game 
organizations); Wirtschafter, supra note 4, at 1510 (“Ultimately, however, big-time college 
sports should be classified as for-profit activities.”). Questions of the appropriate limits of the 
exemption are beyond the scope of this article. For an examination of the UBIT’s role in 
suppressing such questions, see Stone, supra note 5. It should be noted that, although the 
commercialism of college sports has grown over the years, its current political resolution is as 
old as the UBIT itself. See H.R. REP. NO. 81-2319, at 37 (1950) (specifying exemption of 
college sports revenues as “related” business income). Recently, this political resolution has 
come under question. On October 2, 2006, William Thomas, then chair of the House Ways and 
Means Committee, sent a letter to Myles Brand, President of the National College Athletic 
Association (NCAA). Thomas Requests Information on Tax Exemption, College Sports, TAX 
NOTES TODAY, Oct. 5, 2006, LEXIS, 2006 TNT 193-23. The letter presents a number of specific 
questions purportedly seeking to determine “whether major intercollegiate athletics further the 
exempt purpose of the NCAA and, more generally, educational institutions.” Id. Thomas states 
that “[c]orporate sponsorships, multimillion dollar television deals, highly paid coaches with no 
academic duties, and the dedication of inordinate amounts of time by athletes to training lead 
many to believe that major college football and men’s basketball more closely resemble 
professional sports than amateur sports.” Id. He then asks the NCAA to report on the effects of 
I.R.C. § 513(i), which, as discussed below, assured the tax-exempt status of college sport 
sponsorships. Id. For a discussion of I.R.C. § 513(i) and the history of its passage, see infra 
notes 21–60 and accompanying text. There have been other recent media calls for change. See, 
e.g., Daniel Golden, Tax Breaks for Skyboxes, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2006, at B1; George Will, 
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Part I introduces the current taxation of advertising and sponsorship and describes 
the controversy over sponsorship revenue. Part II discusses the distinction between 
advertising and sponsor acknowledgement. This Part also discusses how that 
distinction differs from the distinction between gratuitous and commercial transactions, 
and why it is important to the political symbolism of the charitable exemption and the 
UBIT. Part III uses the distinction set forth in Part II to reexamine the sponsorship 
controversy of the 1990s and its eventual legislative solution. Part IV considers the 
political stability of this solution and discusses alternatives. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Charitable Tax Exemption 
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code7 (“Code”) exempts certain 
“charitable” organizations from the federal income tax. The Code imposes two 
principal requirements for exemption—nonprofit form and exempt purpose.8 The first 
constraint is that the exempt organization must be organized in nonprofit form, such 
that its earnings cannot inure to private benefit.9 The second requirement for exemption 
is that the organization must be organized and operated exclusively for a statutorily 
defined exempt purpose.10  
                                                                                                                 
Time to Rethink the Place of High-Stakes Football in Higher Education?, JEWISH WORLD REV., 
Oct. 24, 2006, available at http://jewishworldreview.com/cols/will102406.php3. Brand’s 
response to Thomas’s letter extols the educational virtues of college athletics and gives factual 
answers to Thomas’s questions where unavoidable. The crux of his answer, however, comes in 
response to Thomas’s question, asking whether federal taxpayers should pay for high-profile 
sports teams that colleges justify as giving themselves an advantage in competing for student 
applicants. Thomas notes that “[f]ederal taxpayers have no interest in increasing applicant pools 
at one school opposed to another.” Id. Brand responds that “while federal taxpayers, in the 
abstract, may have no interest in increasing applicant pools at one school as opposed to another, 
individual taxpayers surely do. Presumably, this is one of the reasons that taxpayers, including 
many Members of Congress, support and contribute to their alma maters and to their local 
schools . . . .” NCAA Answers W&M on Tax-Exemption, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 17, 2006, 
LEXIS, 2006 TNT 222-20. In essence, Brand seems to be saying that the fundamental basis for 
extending a tax exemption to college football and basketball is that they are highly popular with 
members of Congress and their constituents. This seems to be an accurate analysis of the history 
of the exemption and is likely an accurate description of the current situation. Senator Charles 
Grassley, the ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Finance, has called for 
hearings on the question. See Golden, supra. Whether these hearings take place and, if so, 
whether they result in any change will reveal the current accuracy of Brand’s analysis. 
 7. For a more detailed discussion of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), see BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW 
OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 63–317 (8th ed. 2003). 
 8. Two additional constraints, not relevant for this article, limit the exemption to 
organizations “no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or 
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation.” I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 9. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) exempts only organizations “no part of the net earnings of which 
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.” 
 10. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) exempts only organizations “organized and operated exclusively for 
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to 
foster national or international amateur sports competition . . . or for the prevention of cruelty to 
children or animals.” 
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The key word is “charitable.” Courts of equity interpreting the law of charitable 
trust have generally interpreted the term broadly, looking for purposes “designed to 
accomplish objects that are beneficial to the community—i.e., to the public or 
indefinite members thereof—without also serving what amount to private trust 
purposes.”11 The IRS has long adopted this interpretation of the exempt purposes 
requirement.12 
 
B. The Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT) 
1. General 
Exempt organizations owe a tax—the “unrelated business income tax” (UBIT)—on 
their “unrelated business taxable income.”13 The UBIT applies only if three conditions 
are met.14 First, the exempt organization has income from the conduct of a business. 
Second, the exempt organization regularly carries on that business. Finally, the 
business is not substantially related (except as a source of funds) to the exempt 
organization’s performance of its exempt functions. In addition to these restrictions, 
the UBIT also excludes specified categories of “passive” income, such as dividends 
and royalties.15 
Accordingly, for UBIT purposes, income is first divided into tax-free “passive” 
income (income that fits into certain excluded categories) and potentially taxable 
“active” income (income from all other sources). Active income is further divided into 
tax-free “related” income (income from the active conduct of a business related to an 
exempt purpose), and taxable “unrelated” income (income from all other active 
business endeavors). 
New York University’s (NYU) acquisition of the Mueller Noodle Company—the 
poster case for the UBIT—provides an easy framework to illustrate these distinctions.16 
If NYU earns income by operating the C.F. Mueller pasta factory, that business is 
regularly carried on and bears no relationship to NYU’s educational purpose. The 
income is taxable. By contrast, if NYU has a culinary school that teaches students to 
make pasta, NYU is regularly carrying on a business (education for tuition payments), 
but the business is related to NYU’s exempt purpose. The UBIT does not apply. If 
NYU receives dividends on the publicly traded common stock of the American Italian 
Pasta Company or interest from that company’s bonds, that income fits into the passive 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 general cmt. a (1992) (citation omitted). 
 12. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1). This regulation was first adopted in 1959. See 
T.D. 6391, 1959-2 C.B. 139, 144. Subsequent amendments have not changed the basic 
definition of an exempt purpose. 
 13. See I.R.C. § 511. Generally speaking, UBIT is adjusted gross income less deductible 
expenses directly related to an unrelated business. See I.R.C. §§ 512(a), 513(a). The UBIT is 
levied at either the corporate or trust rates, depending on the nature of the exempt organization. 
See I.R.C. § 511(a)(1) (corporations); id. § 511(b)(1) (trusts). 
 14. See I.R.C. §§ 512(a), 513(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a). 
 15. See I.R.C. § 512(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-1. 
 16. See C. F. Mueller Co. v. Comm’r, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951) for the facts of the 
actual case. This paragraph merely uses those facts, and variations on them, to illustrate the 
current rule. Those rules did not apply when the actual transaction took place. 
2007] TAXATION OF CHARITABLE SPONSORSHIPS 219 
 
income exceptions to the UBIT. The UBIT does not apply. Finally, if the C.F. Mueller 
Company donates money to NYU, the donation does not derive from the conduct of a 
business. The UBIT does not apply. 
Because I will be discussing transactions that can be characterized either as 
donations or quid pro quo payments for services rendered, it is worth emphasizing that 
the payor’s tax treatment of a transaction is a distinct matter. Businesses can deduct 
most payments to charity either as charitable contributions under Section 170 of the 
Code or general business expenses under Section 162 of the Code.17 The business’s 
choice of deduction has no direct bearing on whether the charity must pay UBIT.18 
As I have demonstrated elsewhere, the exemption and the UBIT must be understood 
primarily in terms of symbolic politics.19 The charitable exemption’s subsidy for 
charities is not an efficient mechanism for achieving specific policy results. Rather, it is 
a symbolic expression of public support for the general idea of organizations dedicated 
to good works. The UBIT serves to protect the exemption politically by protecting the 
perception that the exemption only subsidizes activities that fit this general idea. The 
UBIT deters charities from engaging in active business pursuits that do not conform 
with popular conceptions of charity. By keeping charities away from such activities, it 
preserves the political symbolism that supports the charitable tax exemption. 
 
2. Advertising/Sponsorship 
The paradigmatic unrelated business is a stand-alone operation, such as NYU’s 
noodle business, unrelated to any exempt function. Code Section 513(c) extends the 
UBIT further to include unrelated businesses carried out within the context of exempt 
activities. The original impetus for this rule, and one of its main applications, is 
advertising income.20 An exempt organization could provide stand-alone advertising 
services, for instance by operating a billboard. Generally, however, exempt 
organizations provide advertising services in the context of their exempt activities. For 
example, an educational magazine may sell advertising pages. Either way, the revenue 
is taxable. 
Although advertising revenues are taxable, “qualified sponsorship payments” are 
not.21 Under Section 513(i) of the Code, a “qualified sponsorship payment” is a 
payment for which the exempt organization gives no “substantial return benefit other 
than the use or acknowledgement of the name or logo (or product lines) of [the 
payor’s] trade or business in connection with the activities of [the recipient].”22 In 
order to qualify, a “use or acknowledgement” of the payor’s name or logo must not 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. The Code limits a corporation’s charitable deductions to ten percent of taxable income. 
See I.R.C. § 170(b)(2). There is no such limit on business deductions. 
 18. Some of the issues involved are closely analogous. See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 
81-45-020 1981 PLR LEXIS 5860 (July 30, 1981) (explaining that benefits to business from 
community goodwill and economic development are too remote to justify business expense 
deduction). 
 19. The following discussion is based on Stone, supra note 5. 
 20. For a discussion of this history, see infra notes 102–107 and accompanying text. 
 21. I.R.C. § 513(i)(1). 
 22. Id. § 513(i)(2)(A). 
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include any “advertising [of the payor’s] products or services.”23 In addition, payments 
contingent on the amount of public exposure of the message (such as television ratings) 
do not qualify.24 Finally, acknowledgements in print periodicals and certain convention 
and trade show activities also do not qualify.25 
On its face, Section 513(c) appears to set the general rule—advertising income is 
taxable—and Section 513(i) appears to define a limited exception for arrangements 
that do not constitute advertising. This appearance is deceptive. Section 513(i) 
effectively exempts almost all advertising income, if we understand “advertising” 
colloquially to mean posting a commercial message for pay. Before I give a technical 
explanation, consider this practical example. 
The 2005 Capital One Bowl26 was organized by Florida Citrus Sports Association, 
Inc. (FCSA), a tax-exempt nonprofit whose exempt purpose is to “promote and foster 
an interest in amateur athletics.”27 FCSA acknowledged the game’s chief sponsor—
Capital One—by naming the game for it. FCSA likewise acknowledged Capital One by 
placing the game logo (containing Capital One’s name) on the players’ uniforms and in 
the center of the field. It also painted Capital One’s name on both sides of the field at 
each twenty-yard line, ensuring that most television pictures of the game would include 
Capital One’s name. Capital One’s name was also placed on billboards around the 
stadium and on screen when the players were introduced.28 It is safe to assume that 
Capital One secured these acknowledgements as enforceable consideration for a 
sponsorship payment to FCSA and that FCSA did not pay tax on the payment. 
In technical terms, this results from the interaction between the provisions of 
Section 513(i). First, Section 513(i) emphasizes that income from an acknowledgement 
transaction can be exempt, even if the transaction is a quid pro quo exchange. This 
means that the IRS cannot establish taxability merely by demonstrating that the sponsor 
had little or no donative intent. The only limit is that the charity’s service to the 
sponsor cannot be “advertising.” Advertising, however, is not defined, other than by a 
nonexclusive list of examples, all of which describe direct exhortations to buy, rather 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. See id. § 513(i)(2)(B)(i). 
 25. See id. § 513(i)(2)(B)(ii). Convention and trade show activities are separately excluded 
under I.R.C. § 513(d). Print periodical advertising was the original impetus for Section 513(c), 
and the subject of United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834 (1986). See 
infra notes 102–107 and accompanying text. Special rules also govern the deduction of the 
exempt organization’s costs against revenue attributable to an unrelated activity that “exploits” 
an exempt-purpose activity. See Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-1(d) (general rules); id. § 1.512(a)-1(f) 
(periodical advertising rules). 
 26. University of Iowa 30, Louisiana State 25. See Randy Peterson, Great Tate: MVP’s 
Game-Ending TD Pass Beats LSU in Bowl, DES MOINES REG., Jan. 2, 2005, at 1C; see also 
http://www.iowaalum.com/pub/music/ iafight.wav. (last visited Sept. 23, 2006). Go Hawks. 
 27. See Florida Citrus Sports Association, Inc., Return of Organization Exempt from 
Income Tax, Form 990, Part III & Statement 3 (2003), available at http://www.guidestar.org/ 
FinDocuments/2004/591/058/2004-591058144-1-9.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2006) [hereinafter 
Capital One Bowl Form 990]. 
 28. Capital One Bowl (ABC television broadcast Jan. 1, 2005). 
2007] TAXATION OF CHARITABLE SPONSORSHIPS 221 
 
than more subtle forms of brand promotion.29 Finally, even if the IRS can prove that a 
charity agreed to provide “advertising” services to its sponsor, the charity owes tax 
only on the portion of the total payment properly allocated to those services.30 
The upshot: the deck is stacked against the IRS except in cases closely matching the 
statute’s examples. Any attempt by the IRS to define a broader scope for “advertising” 
faces a built-in defense. Section 513(i) is clear on only one point: commercial 
sponsorships are usually exempt. Everything else is arguable (and defensible) and tax 
is due only to the extent the IRS wins the argument. 
The IRS finalized regulations under Section 513(i) in 2002.31 The final regulations 
at first appear to add teeth to Section 513(i) by defining “advertising” functionally as 
any message that “promotes or markets any trade or business, or any service, facility, 
or product.”32 This language is derived from Federal Communication Commission 
(FCC) regulations governing sponsorship credits.33 It is intended to allow charities to 
identify sponsors, but not promote them. In theory, the IRS might argue that a very 
aggressive acknowledgement could cross that functional line, even if it did not include 
overt sales promotion. 
Examined more carefully, however, the regulations achieve the same effect as the 
statute. The functional definition of advertising is qualified by a list of sponsor benefits 
that never constitute advertising.34 These exceptions effectively swallow the rule and 
leave “advertising” defined by the statute’s examples. Again, the only clear message is 
that revenue from quid pro quo deals, in which a sponsor pays a charity to publicize 
brand-promotion messages, is not necessarily taxable. 
 
C. The Controversy over Sponsorships 
I will discuss the sponsorship controversy in greater detail below.35 I begin, 
however, with this brief summary to situate the reader. As discussed above, when the 
public controversy over sponsorship revenues began in 1991, Section 513(c) of the 
Code already applied the UBIT to advertising income. The IRS had also already 
considered the tax treatment of donor acknowledgements in analogous contexts. It had 
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. See I.R.C. § 513(i)(2)(A) (“messages containing qualitative or comparative language, 
price information, or other indications of savings or value, an endorsement, or an inducement to 
purchase, sell, or use such products or services”). 
 30. See id. § 513(i)(3). 
 31. See Taxation of Tax-Exempt Organizations’ Income from Corporate Sponsorship, 67 
Fed. Reg. 20,433 (Apr. 25, 2002) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 32. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(v). 
 33. Commission Policy Concerning the Noncommercial Nature of Educational 
Broadcasting Stations, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,534 § 13 (Apr. 5, 1984) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73) 
[hereinafter FCC Rules]. As will be discussed below, Section 513(i) itself derives from the FCC 
Rules. See infra notes 53, 136–140 and accompanying text. 
 34. This list of permitted messages is “exclusive sponsorship arrangements; logos and 
slogans that do not contain qualitative or comparative descriptions of the payor’s products, 
services, facilities or company; a list of the payor’s locations, telephone numbers, or Internet 
address; value-neutral descriptions, including displays or visual depictions, of the payor’s 
product-line or services; and the payor’s brand or trade names and product or service listings.” 
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(iv). 
 35. See infra notes 114–158 and accompanying text. 
222 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 82:213 
 
concluded that such acknowledgements were not improper self-dealing between the 
charity and donor, and that they would not prevent donors from deducting the 
acknowledged contributions as charitable donations.36 In each case, the IRS treated the 
transaction as a donation, even if the donor bargained for an enforceable right to be 
acknowledged. The theory was that acknowledgements had only an incidental value to 
donors. The rule, however, did not seem to depend on the value of particular 
acknowledgements. The rulings did not consider whether the facts seemed to indicate a 
quid pro quo deal. Rather, they seemed conclusively to presume that acknowledging a 
donor, whatever its value, was not the kind of benefit that could transform a donation 
into an exchange.37 
Consequently, it surprised many when the IRS issued two Technical Advice 
Memoranda (“Bowl TAMs”)38 in 1991, holding that payments to sponsor the Mobile 
Cotton Bowl and John Hancock Bowl were taxable unrelated business income in the 
hands of the exempt organizations that presented the games.39 The Bowl TAMs 
recharacterized the IRS’s prior rulings as holding only “that recognition of a donor’s 
generosity can be an insubstantial return benefit.”40 They then held that the recognition 
provided to the bowl sponsors, unlike the acknowledgements in prior rulings, had 
                                                                                                                 
 
 36. See Treas. Reg. § 53-4941(d)-2(f)(9), Example (4) (finding no self-dealing in gift 
conditioned on naming rights), adopted in T.D. 7270, 1973-1 C.B. 473, 483 (as amended in 
T.D. 8639, 60 Fed. Reg. 65,568 (Dec. 20, 1995)); Rev. Rul. 77-367, 1977-2 C.B. 193 (granting 
tax exemption to organization operating replica of nineteenth-century village, although village 
would bear corporate sponsor’s name and corporate sponsor would feature village in its own 
advertising); Rev. Rul. 73-407, 1973-2 C.B. 383 (holding exempt organization’s agreement to 
adopt name of a major contributor for at least one hundred years not prohibited self-dealing); 
Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104 (holding donations to clubs deductible despite 
acknowledgement of donors); Rev. Rul. 67-342, 1967-2 C.B. 187 (approving exemption of 
educational television production company despite on-air acknowledgement of program 
sponsors, without “mention . . . of products or services sold by the sponsors”). 
 37. The point of Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 104, for instance, was to emphasize that 
club dues might be deductible donations or not, depending on the value of membership 
privileges. In the context of this fact-heavy test, the IRS stated flatly that “[s]uch privileges as 
being associated with or being known as a benefactor of the organization are not significant 
return benefits that have a monetary value within the meaning of this Revenue Ruling.” 
 38. A Technical Advice Memorandum is a form of nonprecedential guidance provided by 
the IRS national office at the request of field agents. 
 39. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-31-001, 1991 PLR LEXIS 2722 (Oct. 22, 1991) (John 
Hancock Bowl); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007, 1991 PLR LEXIS 1778 (Aug. 16, 1991) 
(Mobile Cotton Bowl) [hereinafter Cotton Bowl TAM, and, together with TAM 92-31-001, the 
Bowl TAMs]. The IRS is legally required to excise taxpayers’ names and identifying details 
before releasing TAMs. Nonetheless, the taxpayers’ identities were widely known. See, e.g., 
Edited Transcript of Winter EO Committee Meeting: Luncheon Speech—Cotton Bowl 
Comments, 5 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 615, 616 (1992) [hereinafter Winter 1992 Meeting] 
(comments of Bruce Bernstien, who represented Cotton Bowl on audit). Some of the terms of 
the Cotton Bowl’s contract with Mobile likewise leaked. See Paul Streckfus, A Glimpse of the 
Mobile Cotton Bowl Contract Provisions, 55 TAX NOTES 447 (1992). 
 40. Cotton Bowl TAM, supra note 39, at *13 (emphasis added). 
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substantial value. The IRS began to take the same position in audits of other bowl 
game organizers and Olympic sports federations.41 
The targeted charities responded on three fronts, by: (1) fighting the audits, (2) 
enlisting members of Congress to propose legislation, and (3) whipping up concern 
among charities generally.42 The IRS’s first reaction was to publish proposed audit 
guidelines (“Audit Guidelines”) to explain its position.43 The Audit Guidelines first 
noted that “[m]ere acknowledgement or recognition of a corporate contributor as a 
benefactor normally is incidental to the receipt of a contribution and is not of sufficient 
benefit to give rise to unrelated trade or business income.”44 They then told auditors to 
examine sponsorships for signs of advertising sales and provided a list of suggestive 
facts.45 Finally, the Audit Guidelines instructed auditors that 
[a]s a matter of audit tolerance, the Service will not apply these guidelines to 
organizations that are of a purely local nature, that receive relatively insignificant 
gross revenue from corporate sponsors and generally operate with significant 
amounts of volunteer labor. Generally, included among these are youth athletic 
organizations such as little league baseball and soccer teams, and local theatres 
and youth orchestras.46 
Although the Audit Guidelines were formally only a guide to field agents, the IRS 
saw them as “baby regs” and provided a public comment period and hearings in July 
1992.47 The result was a flood of negative written comments, followed by angry 
hearings.48  
Meanwhile, Congress took up the issue. The first bills reversing the Bowl TAMs 
appeared several months before the Bowl TAMs themselves.49 These bills simply 
excluded activities related to amateur athletic events (apparently including outright 
advertising) from the definition of unrelated business. In the fall of 1992, a few months 
after the IRS’s Audit Guidelines hearings, Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1992, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 41. See Mike Fish, IRS Tries to Tax Money Raised by Olympic Sponsorships, 5 EXEMPT 
ORG. TAX REV. 458 (1992). 
 42. For a discussion of the Bowl’s position in the audit, see Winter 1992 Meeting, supra 
note 39 (comments of Bruce Bernstien, who was representing Cotton Bowl on audit). For a 
survey of bills introduced from 1991 to 1996, see Keith L. Henderson, The Tax Treatment of 
Corporate Sponsorship Payments and the Aftermath of the Cotton Bowl Ruling, 13 EXEMPT 
ORG. TAX REV. 789 (1996). For a description of the efforts to spark broader concern, see Gilbert 
Fuchsberg, Special Events Organizers Gird To Battle IRS, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 1991, at B1. 
 43. See I.R.S. Announcement 92-15, 1992-5 I.R.B. 51 [hereinafter Audit Guidelines]. 
 44. Id. at 51 (Purpose). 
 45. See id. § 178.3. 
 46. Id. § 178.2. 
 47. See Paul Streckfus & Julianne MacKinnon, Non-Profit Tax Conference Updates 
Charities on the Latest Developments, 5 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 411, 411 (1992). 
 48. Paul Streckfus, IRS’s Pre-Inaugural Gift for Charities, 7 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 179, 
179 (1992) [hereinafter Streckfus, Gift]. 
 49. See S. 866, 102d Cong. (1991); H.R. 538, 102d Cong. (1991). The bowls had evidently 
concluded that the IRS would rule adversely. See Winter 1992 Meeting, supra note 39, at 622 
(comments of Ed Knight). For a survey of bills introduced from 1991 to 1996, see Henderson, 
supra note 42. 
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which would have become law but for a veto (unrelated to the UBIT issue).50 It 
contained a UBIT exemption for event-sponsorship revenues that was even more 
explicit than the earlier bills in covering advertising revenue for a category of events 
obviously designed to fit college bowl games, the NCAA’s March Madness, and the 
Olympics.51 
A few months later, the IRS scrapped the Audit Guidelines and instead proposed 
formal regulations (“1993 Regulations”).52 The 1993 Regulations were based on the 
FCC’s rules for sponsor acknowledgement.53 The 1993 Regulations allowed exempt 
organizations to enter into openly commercial sponsorship deals without incurring tax 
liability. They tried to limit the practice, however, by distinguishing between 
“advertising” that had the effect of promoting the sponsor’s goods or services and 
“acknowledgements” that did not.54 Only the latter enjoyed a safe harbor from the 
UBIT. The 1993 Regulations also included a “tainting rule”: any arrangement that 
mixed advertising and sponsor acknowledgement would be ineligible for special 
treatment as a sponsor acknowledgement.55 
The charities favored the 1993 Regulations, but opposed the tainting rule.56 
Although they pressured the Treasury to finalize the 1993 Regulations, however, years 
passed with no sign that it planned to do so.57 Eventually, the charities once again 
                                                                                                                 
 
 50. See Bennett Minton, Bush Vetoes Tax Bill, 92 TAX NOTES TODAY 223-1 (1992). 
 51. See H.R. 11, 102d Cong. § 7303 (1992); Conference Report on Tax Bill Passes Senate, 
92 TAX NOTES TODAY 214-97 (1992) (reporting on passage of act). H.R. 11 excluded from 
UBIT “Qualified Sponsorship Payments” received in conjunction with “Qualified Public 
Events.” “Qualified Sponsorship Payments” included “the use of the name or logo of [a 
sponsor’s] trade or business in connection with any Qualified Public Event under arrangements 
(including advertising) in connection with such event which acknowledge such person’s 
sponsorship or promote such person’s products or services,” as well as VIP privileges at the 
event. “Qualified Public Event” included any event substantially related to the presenting 
charity’s exempt purpose, as well as any event held only once a year for less than thirty days. 
The Olympics organizers secured a separate provision in the same bill, providing that any 
payment for which “a substantial part of the consideration” was the right to use the Olympics’ 
trademarks would be considered a royalty for purposes of the UBIT. See H.R. 11 § 7304. 
 52. See Taxation of Tax-Exempt Organizations’ Income from Corporate Sponsorship, 58 
Fed. Reg. 5,687 (Jan. 22, 1993) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) [hereinafter 1993 Regulations]. 
 53. See id. at 5,688 (describing origin in FCC Rules); FCC Rules, supra note 33, § 13. By 
1992, Congress had partially codified the FCC’s approach. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 399A–399B 
(1984).  
 54. See 1993 Regulations, supra note 52, at 5,690. 
 55. See id. Arrangements that did not qualify as acknowledgements might still escape UBIT 
on more general grounds. For instance, if the charity had not provided a substantial return 
benefit to the donor, it would be hard to argue that it had received income from a trade or 
business. Likewise, income might fall into a category of income exempt from UBIT, such as 
royalties. For a discussion of the requirements of the UBIT, see supra notes 13–16 and 
accompanying text. 
 56. Unofficial Transcript of IRS Hearing on Corporate Sponsorship Regs., 93 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 147–23 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Hearing Transcript]. 
 57. See, e.g., Nonprofit Advisors Turn to Capitol Hill for Corporate Sponsorship Guidance, 
TAX DAY REP. (CCH), at A.2 (May 1, 1995) (citing Treasury explanation that “questions that 
have come up in the process of working on other projects that involve UBIT issues have, in turn, 
raised additional concerns with the corporate sponsorship regulations”); Paul Streckfus, Editor’s 
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turned to Congress. The current text of Section 513(i) was first passed in the 1995 
budget act, which was vetoed for other reasons.58 It became law two years later in the 
Taxpayers Relief Act of 1997.59 I have outlined its provisions above.60 
 
II. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ADVERTISING AND SPONSOR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
My first task is to tease apart and analyze the confused and unexamined conceptions 
about advertising and sponsor acknowledgement that undergirded the sponsorship 
controversy in the 1990s. My thesis is that prior accounts are incomplete for two 
reasons. First, they have not taken into account the conceptual distinction between 
advertising and sponsor acknowledgement. Second, they have not differentiated 
between (1) the advertising/sponsor acknowledgement distinction, and (2) the more 
familiar conceptual distinction between commercial and gratuitous payments. 
Understanding these distinctions and the difference between them is important to 
understanding the sponsorship controversy. The 1993 Regulations and Section 513(i) 
represent not simply a retreat from the IRS’s initial position, but a reconceptualization 
of the problem. 
Accordingly, before analyzing the events of the 1990s, I will first develop the 
distinction between advertising and sponsorship and then discuss two ways in which 
that distinction is important for understanding the UBIT’s application to sponsorship 
revenues. Subpart A discusses the conceptual distinction between advertising and 
sponsor acknowledgement. In Subpart B, I point out that this distinction is not the same 
as the distinction between commercial and gratuitous transactions, with which it is 
often confused. In Subpart C, I show that the two distinctions are not only conceptually 
distinct, but also have different meanings in the context of the symbolic politics that 
support the charitable exemption and underlie the UBIT. 
 
A. Distinction Between Advertising and Sponsor Acknowledgement 
This Subpart distinguishes two types of quid pro quo transaction between charities 
and third parties: advertising and sponsor acknowledgement. It is worth emphasizing 
that as I am using these terms, neither involves any element of gratuitous altruism. In 
each case a business (the advertiser/sponsor) pays a charity to transmit a commercially 
valuable message (an advertisement or sponsorship acknowledgement). This 
                                                                                                                 
Notebook, 11 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 311, 311 (1995) (discussing efforts to finalize the 
regulations); Testimony of the American Society of Association (ASAE) Before the Committee on 
Ways & Means of the U.S. House of Representatives, 12 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 371, 376 
(1995) (complaining about delay); Treasury Working on Corporate Sponsorship, 11 EXEMPT 
ORG. TAX REV. 875 (1995) (February 2, 1995 letter from Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Secretary 
for Tax Policy, Department of the Treasury, replying to letter from Senator J. Bennett Johnston). 
 58. See H.R. 2491, 104th Cong. § 12702 (1995) (as passed by the Senate on October 27, 
1995), reprinted in 211 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Special Supp., at d39 (Nov. 1, 1995); Ann 
Devroy & Eric Pianin, Clinton Vetoes GOP’s 7-Year Balanced Budget Plan, WASH. POST, Dec. 
7, 1995, at A1. 
 59. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 965, 111 Stat. 788, 893–94 
(1997) (codified as I.R.C. § 513(i)). 
 60. See generally supra notes 21–34 and accompanying text (discussing Section 513(i) and 
subsequent regulations). 
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distinction, while at the center of the sponsorship controversy, has never been clearly 
separated in the legal literature from the distinction between gifts and sponsorships, 
although it has been much discussed in academic and professional marketing literature.  
The distinction is simple in theory: transactions in which the sponsor pays to be 
connected to the sponsored organization and transactions in which an advertiser pays 
for exposure for a commercial message. To illustrate it in the UBIT context, consider 
what would constitute a “pure” sale of advertisement for UBIT purposes. To qualify, 
the arrangement could allow no argument that the payor was merely receiving a “thank 
you” for a gratuitous donation. The only possible description would be a payment for 
advertising services. 
An easy example is a charity-owned billboard, rented on commercial terms.61 
Assume the charity exerts no substantive control over messages posted and that the 
billboard exhibits no obvious connection to its owner. It is impossible to characterize 
the leasing of billboard space as a donation and acknowledgement. No viewer could 
understand the billboard as a communication by the owner, let alone as a “thank you” 
to the advertiser. The billboard’s value depends solely on its visibility. I call this pure 
advertising value a “billboard effect.” 
Contrast this to a pure paid sponsor acknowledgement, in which the sponsor pays 
for a “thank you” but cannot be said to have paid for a billboard effect. These are rare 
in the real world. To give a plausible example, however, assume that a drug maker 
sponsors rural clinics in an undeveloped country. The sponsor insists on the contractual 
right to place a large sign with its logo at each clinic entrance. Why? The signs provide 
no billboard effect. Drug makers aim their commercial communications at patients, 
prescribing doctors, regulators, and politicians in developed countries, none of whom 
will see the signs. The signs’ value is the association they make between the drug 
company and a worthy cause. To realize the value of this association, of course, the 
drug maker needs to design advertisements (featuring pictures of the clinic) and display 
them where developed-country consumers, doctors, regulators, and politicians will see 
them. The transaction with the clinic, however, is valuable and distinct from the ad 
buys that eventually publicize it. I call this pure association value a “halo effect.” 
Scholars of marketing have noted and studied this distinction between billboards 
and halos for decades. The upshot of the marketing research is that one of the unique 
benefits of sponsorship is its ability to generate a halo effect—an association between a 
company or brand and the goodwill of a well-liked organization or event.62 Marketing 
                                                                                                                 
 
 61. Assume also that the owner provided services beyond simple access to real property, 
such as workers to paint the billboard, so that the arrangement could not be exempt as rent. See 
I.R.C. § 512(b)(3). 
 62. See, e.g., Drew Barrand, Sizing Up Sponsorship, MARKETING, Aug. 2, 2006, at 17 
(quoting an advertising agency executive who states, “‘[t]here will always be people who equate 
sponsorship to a media buy because it makes it easier to understand. But this type of thinking 
removes the principal benefits of using sponsorship—that it can deliver much more for your 
brand than pure media exposure. Sponsorship is not just about how many times your logo 
appears on TV.’”); Paul N. Bloom et al., How Social-Cause Marketing Affects Consumer 
Perceptions, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Winter 2006, at 49, 51 (“We hypothesize that the 
primary reason why demonstrating a high degree of affinity can enhance the effectiveness of a 
promotional initiative is that it increases the likelihood that consumers will treat the initiative 
itself—or, more generally, the brand’s ‘style of marketing’—as an important and positively 
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scholars also recognize that a sponsor cannot fully realize this value from the billboard 
effect of brand exposure at a well-publicized event.63 The impact of such exposure is 
highly contingent and depends in large part on the strength of the association between 
the sponsor and the halo of the sponsored organization or event. 
Marketing researchers have repeatedly stressed that a perceived fit between the 
sponsor and the event sponsored tends to make sponsorship more effective. If the fit is 
wrong, sponsorship can backfire. Viewers perceive that the sponsored organization has 
sold out. This perception can damage both the sponsor and the sponsored 
organization.64 Genuine supporters of cool things look cool, but obviously false fans 
                                                                                                                 
weighted attribute of the brand.”); James Crimmins & Martin Horn, Sponsorship: From 
Management Ego Trip to Marketing Success, J. ADVERTISING RES., July/August 1996, at 11, 12 
(“Sponsorship is a means of persuasion that is fundamentally different from traditional 
advertising . . . Sponsorship improves the perception of a brand by flanking our beliefs about the 
brand and linking the brand to an event or organization that the target audience already values 
highly.”); Tony Meenaghan, Sponsorship—Legitimising the Medium, 25 EUR. J. MARKETING 5, 
8 (1991) [hereinafter, Meenaghan 1991] (noting “goodwill” aspect of sponsorship as principal 
difference from advertising); Dennis M. Sandler & David Shani, Olympic Sponsorship vs. 
“Ambush” Marketing: Who Gets the Gold?, J. ADVERTISING RES., August/September 1989, at 9, 
10 (defining sponsorship as “[t]he provision of resources (e.g. money, people, equipment) by an 
organization directly to an event or activity in exchange for a direct association to the event or 
activity.”). 
 63. An advertising executive, for instance, recently reacted to evidence that advertisers 
doubt sponsorships affect brand visibility and that viewers do not recall cluttered sponsors’ 
brands, by noting that “advertisers are still keen to connect with people’s interests and passions. 
It would be naïve to suggest that these advertisers . . . are [pursuing sponsorships] just for 
broadcast exposure.” Alastair Reid, Is Sponsorship Really Worth It?, CAMPAIGN, Feb. 11, 2005, 
at 10 (quoting Laurence Munday). 
 64. See Karen L. Becker-Olsen & Carolyn J. Simmons, When Do Social Sponsorships 
Enhance or Dilute Equity? Fit, Message Sources, and the Persistence of Effects, 29 ADVANCES 
IN CONSUMER RES. 287 (2002); Bloom et al., supra note 62; Michel Tuan Pham & Gita 
Venkataramani Johar, Market Prominence Biases in Sponsor Identification: Processes and 
Consequentiality, 18 PSYCHOL. AND MARKETING 123 (2001) [hereinafter Pham 2001]; Richard 
Speed & Peter Thompson, Determinants of Sports Sponsorship Response, 28 J. OF THE ACAD. OF 
MARKETING SCI. 227 (2000). Some recent experiments found that social-cause sponsorships, 
whether high-fit or low-fit, improved consumer perceptions of a beer brand, whereas 
sponsorships of commercial events degraded perceptions. See Bloom, et al., supra note 62. 
There is also evidence that the combination of a good fit and a high-status event sends a 
message of insincerity by making the sponsor’s instrumental reasons for sponsoring the event 
too obvious. See Speed & Thompson, supra, at 236. The viewers’ level of interest and 
involvement with the sponsored activity also makes a difference, although not in straightforward 
ways. See Aron Levin, Chris Joiner & Gary Cameron, The Impact of Sports Sponsorship on 
Consumers’ Brand Attitudes and Recall: The Case of NASCAR Fans, J. CURR. ISSUES & RES. IN 
ADVERTISING, Fall 2001, at 23 (finding level of involvement affects impact of sponsorship on 
brand attitude but not recall); Michel Tuan Pham, Effects of Involvement, Arousal, and Pleasure 
on the Recognition of Sponsorship Stimuli, in ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RESEARCH 85 (John F. 
Sherry & Brian Sternthal eds. 1992) [hereinafter Pham 1992] (finding brand recall increasing 
with greater levels of involvement to a point and then diminishing and that greater levels of 
arousal diminish recall); See also Sponsorship to Reveal Its Full Brand Potential, MARKETING 
WK., Dec. 2, 2004, at 17 (reporting British ITV network’s decision to discontinue service 
measuring viewer recall of sponsor brands in favor of “qualitative” measurement of “the creative 
fit between programme and sponsor”); Rich Thomaselli, Now, Many Words From Our Sponsor, 
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look lame.65 “Ambush marketers” can also snatch the halo from an unwary sponsor’s 
head with advertising messages that suggest a sponsorship relationship where none 
exists.66 
Marketing scholars have also long recognized another aspect of sponsorships that 
drew the IRS’s attention as it approached the issue in the late 1980s: halo deals usually 
include a significant billboard effect.67 Popular events are natural billboards. This 
billboard effect of sponsorship is easy to quantify, and therefore received much 
attention in the 1980s, as sponsorships became increasingly commercial and 
professional. Evaluation consultants, eager to tout their services to sponsors, and 
marketers, eager to justify increasing sponsorship expenditures, liked this simple 
measure.68 The IRS was heavily influenced by reports on this kind of sponsorship 
evaluation when it was preparing the Bowl TAMs.69  
                                                                                                                 
ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 3, 2005, at 6 (describing efforts of a Detroit Pistons’ sponsor to offset 
“any perception of overkill with the Rock Financial logo” by community work with Pistons 
players and distribution of free Pistons tickets to “charity and youth groups.”). 
 65. See, e.g., Kevin P. Gwinner, A Model of Image Creation and Image Transfer in Event 
Sponsorship, 14 INT’L MARKETING REV. 145, 150 (1997) (“The perceived promotional 
appearance of a brand’s sponsorship activities may appear anywhere along a spectrum from 
advertiser to benefactor. A perception towards the benefactor end of the spectrum may lead to 
increased feelings of goodwill towards the brand because it is perceived as donating funds to 
make the event possible. Conversely, there may be a negative reaction to the commercialization 
of events that have not been sponsored in the past. These events may be perceived as ‘selling 
out’ to the corporate world.”). But see Horst Stipp & Nicholas P. Schiavone, Modeling the 
Impact of Olympic Sponsorship on Corporate Image, J. ADVERTISING RES., July/August 1996, at 
22, 24 (interpreting results of consumer survey of reaction to Olympic sponsorship to mean that 
consumers were aware of sponsors’ commercial goals, but were nonetheless favorably disposed 
towards them). Knauer ignores this dynamic and improbably assumes that the form of deduction 
a business takes for its sponsorship payments (a fact not publicly disclosed) plays a significant 
role in determining whether the public confers a halo. See Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of 
Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, the Nature of the Corporation, and the Social 
Construction of Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 42–43 (1994) [hereinafter Knauer, Paradox]. 
 66. See, e.g., Tony Meenaghan, Ambush Marketing—A Threat to Corporate Sponsorship, 
38 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 103, 106 (1996); Sandler & Shani, supra note 62, at 51; Sponsorship Is 
More than Just a Logo, BRAND STRATEGY, Sept. 15, 2004, at 46, 47–48 (reporting ambush 
marketing at the Euro 2004 soccer tournament and Mastercard’s efforts to counter it by 
leveraging its sponsorship). 
 67. See, e.g., Crimmins & Horn, supra note 62, at 12; John A. Meenaghan, Commercial 
Sponsorship, 7 EUR. J. MARKETING 5, 23–24 (1983). 
 68. See, e.g., Speed & Thompson, supra note 64, at 227 (criticizing focus of consultants 
with “origins . . . in publicity and public relations” on measuring exposure). 
 69. See Paul Streckfus, Service’s EO Office Cracks Down on ‘Big Business’ Aspect of 
Nonprofits, 5 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 787, 787 (1992) [hereinafter Streckfus, EO Office] 
(quoting James McGovern, IRS Associate Chief Counsel (Employee Benefits and Exempt 
Organizations)); Transcript of the Afternoon Session of the Spring EO Committee Meeting: 
Panel 6: Unrelated Business Income Tax Issues, 6 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 388, 391–92 (1992) 
(statement of Beth Purcell, Office of Chief Counsel (Employee Benefits and Exempt 
Organizations)) [hereinafter Spring 1992 Meeting]. For the reports in question, see STEPHEN A. 
GREYSER & JOHN L. TEOPACO, HARVARD BUS. SCH., JOHN HANCOCK FINANCIAL SERVICES: 
SPORTS SPONSORSHIP (1987); Michael J. McCarthy, Keeping Careful Score on Sports Tie-Ins, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 1991, at B1. 
2007] TAXATION OF CHARITABLE SPONSORSHIPS 229 
 
The billboard effect often provides a significant part of a sponsorship’s value.70 
Marketers are generally aware, however, that they cannot draw a one-to-one 
correspondence between casual brand exposure in the course of an event and brand 
exposure through traditional advertising, in which the advertiser controls all aspects of 
the exposure and can convey a crafted message. There is no automatic link between 
brand exposure and effects on viewers. In particular, exposure seems to work 
differently with and without concurrent advertising.71 It is accepted wisdom among 
experts that a sponsor should spend several times more on advertising and other efforts 
to purchase exposure for (and shape the message of) a sponsorship than it spends on 
the actual sponsorship.72 
Successful sponsorships blend billboard and halo effects and leverage the resulting 
message with traditional advertising. For example, Capital One achieved a billboard 
effect merely by sponsoring (and renaming) the Capital One Bowl. To emphasize and 
elaborate on the association, however, Capital One also bought time from ABC to run 
ads for its Prime Lock cards and No Hassle Rewards program during many breaks in 
the broadcast.73 
In practice, the distinction between advertising and sponsor acknowledgement is a 
continuum, not a dichotomy between discrete categories. Real sponsorships fall 
somewhere on this continuum between a hypothetical pure advertisement and pure 
sponsorship. For an example of this, consider this cluster of public radio sponsorship 
acknowledgements: 
Support for NPR comes: from Visa, offering the Visa Signature Card, featuring 
concierge services for travel, dining and entertainment, at visa.com/signature; from 
AAAS and its journal Science, advancing science, serving society, and promoting 
science literacy, on the web at aaas.org; and from Wal-Mart, providing jobs and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 70. See, e.g., DAVID A. AAKER & ERICH JOACHIMSTHALER, BRAND LEADERSHIP 198, 201 
(2000) (contrasting $15 million cost of Mastercard’s 1994 World Cup sponsorship with $25 
million value of pure brand exposure, after applying 95% discount to normal advertising rates). 
IEG’s 2005 survey of sponsorship decision makers’ goals found that about the same percentage 
of decision makers rated “increase brand loyalty” (68%) and “create awareness/visibility” (65%) 
as top goals. See IEG, Inc., Performance Research / IEG Study Highlights What Sponsors Want, 
http://www.sponsorship.com/learn/decisionmakerstudy.asp. “Showcas[ing] community/social 
responsibility” trailed at 43%. See id. 
 71. See, e.g., Levin et al., supra note 64 (studying differential effects of brands featured on 
NASCAR cars, in advertising during broadcast, and both in conjunction); Pham 2001, supra 
note 64 (finding impacts of overall brand prominence and clarity of brand-sponsor association 
on both sponsorship recall and brand image); Pham 1992, supra note 64 (finding minor brand 
recognition effects from billboards around a soccer field, decreasing as to intensely involved or 
aroused viewers). 
 72. See, e.g., AAKER & JOACHIMSTHALER, supra note 70, at 225; Sponsorship is More than 
Just a Logo, supra note 66, at 46. This conventional wisdom among experts is less than 
universal among sponsors. A 2005 survey of sponsorship decision makers found that thirty 
percent spent less leveraging the sponsorship than on the sponsorship itself. Roughly the same 
percentage spent twice as much or more on leveraging. For the remainder the ratio was 1:1. See 
IEG, supra note 70. These numbers nonetheless demonstrate that most sponsors do not expect to 
get all or even most of the “billboard effect” they are seeking from the sponsorship itself. 
 73. See Capital One Bowl, supra note 28. 
230 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 82:213 
 
opportunities for millions of Americans of all ages and all walks of life. Our 
people make the difference. Information at walmartstores.com.74 
The primary motive behind the Visa message seems to be advertising—the desire to 
publicize the high-end “Signature Card” to an affluent and educated public radio 
audience. Visa might also be interested in association with NPR, but the message 
suggests that sales promotion is the main goal. The motives of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science are ambiguous. It may be sponsoring NPR 
in pursuit of its charitable purpose—advancing the understanding of science—and 
merely accepting recognition. It could also be an advertisement for the journal Science. 
Wal-Mart is trying to rent a halo. It knows many members of the NPR audience, 
including many community leaders who can make political trouble, view Wal-Mart as 
rapacious.75 The message—which touts positive contributions to society, not everyday 
low prices—is designed to emphasize an association with the public radio halo. On the 
other hand, Wal-Mart must also be paying for the billboard effect of a nationwide radio 
broadcast to the target audience. 
It is important to note that the 1993 Regulations and Section 513(i), like the FCC 
Rules they followed, use the distinction between advertising and sponsor 
acknowledgement. Unlike prior doctrine, they allowed exempt organizations to enter 
into openly commercial sponsorship deals. Rather than distinguish between 
commercial and gratuitous transactions, they distinguished between transactions in 
which the sponsor paid to be identified as such and transactions in which an advertiser 
sought exposure for a message promoting sales.76 As will be discussed below, 
identifying this distinction allows us to see that the IRS did not simply capitulate to 
charities’ demands not to be taxed. Instead, it proposed a distinction between taxable 
and exempt revenues that fit better into the political symbolism of the exemption and 
the UBIT. 
 
B. Distinction Between Advertising and Sponsor Acknowledgement Contrasted with 
Distinction Between Commercial and Gratuitous Transactions 
With the distinction between advertising and sponsor acknowledgement clearly in 
mind, it is now possible to point out how it differs from the distinction that initially 
                                                                                                                 
 
 74. All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast Oct. 6, 2004). 
 75. See Constance L. Hays, Wal-Mart Tries to Shine Its Image by Supporting Public 
Broadcasting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2004, at C1 (quoting a spokesperson describing the goal as 
reaching “community leaders and [to] help them understand the value that we bring to their 
areas”). 
 76. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. This is a simplification. The dividing 
line is between payments made for a “substantial return benefit” and those that are not. I.R.C. § 
513(i)(2)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(1). The regulations identify certain benefits, other than 
advertising, that could constitute a substantial return benefit. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(iii). 
The thrust of Section 513(i) and the regulations, however, is not to inform us that payments to a 
charity in exchange for substantial goods, services, or contractual rights might result in 
unrelated business income. That is obvious. The innovation is that payments to a charity in 
exchange for valuable sponsor acknowledgements can never produce UBIT, so long as the 
acknowledgements do not include advertising. 
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drove the sponsorship controversy: the distinction between commercial and gratuitous 
transactions. As discussed above, payments to charities for advertising and sponsor 
acknowledgement, as used here, are commercial transactions. Many payments to 
charities, however, are gratuitous. Accordingly, we must consider a second conceptual 
distinction when we examine sponsorships: the distinction between gratuitous gifts to 
charity that the recipient charity publicly acknowledges and commercial payments 
made for the purpose of securing a valuable public acknowledgement. 
Charities customarily acknowledge their benefactors. Usually (at least for individual 
donations) the parties nonetheless view the transaction as a gratuitous gift, not a 
purchase of acknowledgement services.77 The psychology and economics of charitable 
giving by individuals is a difficult and hotly debated topic.78 There are good reasons to 
believe that individuals often give, not as a calculated strategy to achieve concrete 
benefits, but rather because they value (as an end in itself) a self-image of generosity 
and responsibility, conformance with social norms, or the well-being of other people or 
things.79 Such donors may expect thanks without buying them. The charity’s grateful 
acknowledgement of the gift is the socially expected response to a display of 
generosity. The donor would be insulted (and society would condemn the charity) if 
public thanks were not forthcoming. But expectations are not the same as 
motivations.80 Examples of this kind of transaction abound. Many charities, for 
instance, regularly distribute newsletters to their staff, donors, and volunteers listing 
the names of significant donors.81 
By contrast, ad buys and purchases of sponsor acknowledgements are not gifts. 
They are payments for services. The sponsor has little or no altruistic motivation. It 
                                                                                                                 
 
 77. The donor may feel subjectively that the transaction was “worth it.” However, any value 
a genuine donor obtains (e.g., empathetic satisfaction or the satisfaction of conforming to social 
or ideological norms) is not a scarce good ceded by the recipient at its market value. The transfer 
of money is deceptive. The donor is not “buying” satisfaction. He is doing something with his 
money that satisfies him. As will be discussed below, this is not true of a quid pro quo 
sponsorship transaction in which the sponsor is deliberately purchasing a public 
acknowledgement. 
 78. See John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable 
Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theories For The Deduction And Tax Exemption, 36 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657, 667–79 (2001) (describing theories). 
 79. See id. For purposes of this discussion, there is thankfully no need to descend into fine 
distinctions between models of human behavior in which purely selfish individuals indulge 
“tastes” for the well-being of others and models in which the existence of such “tastes” is taken 
as evidence that people simply have unselfish motivations to begin with. 
 80. John Colombo labels such transactions with charities “quasi purchases” and proposes 
that revenue from them be taxed. His logic is that the quid pro quo form of the transaction 
indicates that the charity has overcome the free-rider problem in raising donations for which he 
believes the exemption compensates. See id. at 686. I agree with his characterization of the 
economic character of some of these transactions. In many other cases, however, I do not think a 
donor who is acknowledged can fairly be said to have “purchased” the acknowledgement. Social 
norms of gratitude may cause both the donor and donee to feel that a public acknowledgement is 
particularly appropriate where the donor is clearly acting altruistically. 
 81. See, e.g., Thank You!, IOWA CITY HOSPICE COMMUNICATOR (Iowa City Hospice, Iowa 
City, Iowa), Fall 2005, at 4–17, available at http://www.iowacityhospice.org/documents/ 
Fall2005Communicator.pdf (listing donors). 
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values the charity’s acknowledgement at or above the money paid to secure that 
acknowledgement. Examples of this kind of transaction also abound and have been 
discussed above.82 
This distinction between transfers made out of “disinterested generosity” and 
transfers made as part of a quid pro quo exchange is familiar as a legal standard. In 
theory, it still defines the legal divide between nontaxable gift revenues and potentially 
taxable income, both with respect to taxable individuals and charities.83 
Not surprisingly, in the initial stages of the sponsorship controversy, both the IRS 
and the charities viewed the issue purely in light of the distinction between commercial 
and gratuitous transactions. Before and in the immediate aftermath of the Bowl TAMs, 
both the IRS and affected charities approached the sponsorship issue as litigants. From 
this perspective, only existing doctrine mattered. The IRS’s position was that the Bowl 
sponsorships were commercial arrangements, not donations. The charities’ opposition 
mainly focused on technical UBIT issues, such as the definition of “regularly carried 
on” and the royalty exception.84 
The IRS’s initial position is easy to understand. The structure of the UBIT suggests 
a dichotomy between gratuitous payments, which are exempt as gifts, and payments 
received in the conduct of a trade or business, which are exempt only if the trade or 
business is related to an exempt purpose. Congress seemed to confirm this structure in 
1969 by adding Section 513(c) to tax advertisements. Likewise, the weight of doctrine 
in related areas leads naturally to this point of view.85 From the IRS’s perspective, the 
Bowl TAMs were a straightforward application of existing doctrine. A simple “thank 
you” was not taxable, but a deal in which a sponsor paid full value for a valuable 
commercial message was likely to be taxable advertising. 
When the protests began, the IRS initially assumed it had been misunderstood 
because the egregious facts of the Bowl TAMs had been redacted to comply with 
taxpayer confidentiality requirements. At the height of the IRS’s initial confidence, 
James J. McGovern, the Associate Chief Counsel (Employee Benefits and Exempt 
Organizations), was at pains to note that “mere acknowledgment of a donation would 
                                                                                                                 
 
 82. See supra notes 26–28, 74–75 and accompanying text for examples. 
 83. See Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 689–703 (1989) (charitable donations); 
Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285–286 (1960) (noncharitable gifts). The rules in 
Hernandez and Duberstein are related but not identical. Duberstein turns on the donor’s 
subjective intent, whereas Hernandez imposes an objective test to determine whether the 
transfer was conditioned on receipt of a return benefit. In most cases, however, the only credible 
evidence of the donor’s intent is receipt of a return benefit. The IRS quickly backed off of its 
victory against the Scientologists in Hernandez, apparently out of fear that the courts would 
force it to apply the standard to religions other than Scientology. See Allan J. Samansky, 
Deductibility of Contributions to Religious Institutions, 24 VA. TAX REV. 65, 67–68 (2004). The 
IRS’s decision to ignore the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Code, rather than seeking 
new legislation in Congress, is problematic. Nonetheless, it casts serious doubts on the practical 
importance of Hernandez.  
 84. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text for a summary of these statutory issues. 
By giving scant attention to these arguments, I do not mean to imply that they were not well 
taken. Their merits are not relevant to the discussion here, however, because the controversy 
was not resolved on the basis of existing doctrine. 
 85. See supra notes 67–83 and accompanying text. 
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still be allowed.”86 He then explained that “[w]hat you are seeing today is the IRS 
looking at (tax-exempt) universities and hospitals and seeing them for what they are—
big businesses . . . a very different universe than what existed just 10 years ago.”87 The 
IRS apparently thought this would quiet the protests. It assumed that the vast majority 
of charities were not “big business” charities participating in commercial sponsorships 
and those who were would recognize that they had been caught red handed. 
Starting from this premise, the Audit Guidelines had two primary purposes: First 
they were intended to warn “big business” charities and anyone thinking about joining 
them that commercial arrangements would be taxable, no matter how they were 
dressed. Second, they were intended to allay the fears of “authentic” charities that the 
IRS was trying to tax customary arrangements.88 
The Audit Guidelines tried to achieve their first objective by providing auditors 
with a long list of facts and circumstances that might indicate a taxable arrangement.89 
Among the facts evidencing advertising were promises to feature the sponsor’s name or 
logo in the event name or elsewhere and payments contingent on receiving specified 
TV ratings or other benefits (such as VIP treatment for sponsor personnel).90 Auditors 
were to watch for “promotional arrangements that do more than merely acknowledge 
the sponsor” such as specifications of an acknowledgement’s size, color or content, and 
commitments to feature the sponsor’s products or services.91 
This approach left any charity negotiating a sponsorship deal in grave uncertainty, 
compared to the prior approach, but that did not trouble IRS officials. They felt that 
charities that were “negotiating deals,” rather than simply thanking their benefactors, 
defined the problem.92 Some early pronouncements about sponsorships took a very 
sarcastic tone.93 Any charity that wanted to negotiate deals had already crossed over 
the line between soliciting gifts and selling advertising services. Anything it did over 
that line deserved no consideration.94 
                                                                                                                 
 
 86. Streckfus, EO Office, supra note 69, at 787. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Russlyn Guritz & Charles Barrett, Corporate Sponsorship Income § 4, in INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TEXT FOR 
FY 1993 § 5 (1992), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicf93.pdf (discussing the 
Audit Guidelines as an attempt “to convey to the public the nature of the Service’s concerns, 
and . . . alleviate public concerns about how the ruling affected them specifically”); Streckfus, 
EO Office, supra note 69, at 787 (quoting James McGovern that “mere acknowledgment of a 
donation would still be allowed but . . . the Service would, in cases that smelled of advertising, 
‘apply a facts-and-circumstances test’”). 
 89. See Audit Guidelines, supra note 43, § 178.3; Guritz & Barrett, supra note 88, § 6 
(Audit Guidelines are designed “to publicize those factors which the Service concludes make 
these arrangements akin to advertising.”). 
 90. See Audit Guidelines, supra note 43, § 178.3(a). 
 91. See id. § 178.3(c). 
 92. See Guritz & Barrett, supra note 88, § 1 (quoting promotional blurb touting marketing 
value of Fiesta Bowl sponsorship). 
 93. See Streckfus, EO Office, supra note 69, at 787 (quoting James McGovern as thanking a 
candid John Hancock marketing consultant “for putting your John Hancock on that”). 
 94. See, e.g., IRS Casts Wider Audit Net; New Guidelines Portend Broadened Taxation, 5 
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 436 (1992) [hereinafter Audit Net] (quoting Marcus Owens, Director, 
IRS Exempt Organizations Technical Division) (“Our guidelines apply to organizations that 
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The Audit Guidelines tried to achieve their second objective—calming small and 
authentic charities—by reassuring them that the enforcement policy had not changed 
and they were not targets. The title of the press release that announced the Audit 
Guidelines was “EXEMPT ORGANIZATION DONOR RECOGNITION IS NOT 
ADVERTISING.”95 The Audit Guidelines themselves began by stating that “mere 
acknowledgement” of a donor would not compromise the exempt status of a 
donation.96 They also specified that certain traditional forms of donor 
acknowledgement were not advertising and stated that the guidelines would not apply 
at all “[a]s a matter of audit tolerance” to small community groups.97  
There were pragmatic reasons to ignore small groups:  They were simply too small 
to be worth auditing. The IRS, however, also seems to have assumed that most 
traditional charities were not selling commercial sponsorships and would calm down if 
assured that they and their practices were not targets.98 They would not mind the 
indeterminate facts-and-circumstances approach because they were not selling 
commercial sponsorships and could easily steer clear of bowl-game excesses. Their 
business sponsors, if any, were neighborhood merchants who gave out of public spirit 
and were acknowledged out of unforced gratitude.99 
As discussed further below, the IRS quickly abandoned its initial view of the 
problem. It soon realized that commercial sponsorships were not confined to “big 
business” charities. More importantly, it discovered that commercial sponsorships were 
not as clearly within the scope of the UBIT as preexisting doctrine suggested. 
 
C. The Political Implications of Sponsorship and Advertising 
The above subparts have introduced the conceptual distinction between advertising 
and sponsor acknowledgement and contrasted it with the distinction between 
commercial and gratuitous transactions. Before using these concepts to analyze the 
sponsorship controversy, I will examine one additional preliminary implication of the 
distinction between advertising and sponsorship: the differing meanings of advertising 
and sponsor acknowledgement within the symbolic politics of the UBIT and the 
charitable exemption. 
                                                                                                                 
have held themselves out as advertising vehicles. Essentially, if the sponsor’s logo is 
everywhere, then it’s advertising.”); Spring 1992 Meeting, supra note 69, at 392 (statement of 
Beth Purcell, Office of Chief Counsel (Employee Benefits and Exempt Organizations)) (“‘We 
don’t think this is even close. This is not traditional recognition of donor generosity. This is 
basically event sponsorship marketing, a very up to date advertising technique . . . .’”). 
 95. I.R.S. News Release IR-92-4 (Jan. 17, 1992). 
 96. See Audit Guidelines, supra note 43, at introduction. 
 97. See id. § 178.1(2) (naming university professorships, scholarships, and buildings; 
naming public broadcast and museum underwriters; listing contributors in event programs); id. § 
178.2 (defining audit tolerance); supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text. 
 98. See Joanne Lipman, Companies’ Sponsorship of Events Is Threatened by IRS’s Ruling, 
WALL. ST. J., Dec. 5, 1991, at B8 (quoting IRS spokesman who stressed that “[o]nly nonprofit 
events that actively advertise their sponsors are at risk” from the Bowl TAMs). 
 99. See Streckfus & MacKinnon, supra note 47, at 411 (remarks of Marcus S. Owens, 
Director, IRS Exempt Organizations Technical Division, contrasting bowl game sponsorship 
contingent on television ratings with corporation whose name merely “appeared on a banner at 
the end of a fun run”). 
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Advertising and sponsorship acknowledgement are symbolically charged, in the 
context of the charitable exemption. As discussed above, the exemption and the UBIT 
are properly understood in terms of political symbolism.100 The UBIT steers charities 
away from activities that clash with popular perceptions of charity and, thus, protects 
the exemption, which serves as a symbolic expression of those perceptions. Viewed in 
this context, the reason the UBIT applies to advertising is clear. Pure advertising is 
exactly the kind of unrelated business activity the UBIT is designed to deter. It is 
indistinguishable from normal for-profit business activities. A charity-owned billboard 
is exactly the same business as a billboard owned by an individual or business 
corporation. The billboard’s value depends entirely on exposure, not on the owner’s 
mission or activities.101 Accordingly, pure advertising has the same potential to 
undermine political support for the exemption as other unrelated business activities. 
The origins of Section 513(c) of the Code illustrate the role of symbolic politics. 
Major exempt magazine publishers—such as National Geographic, Nation’s Business, 
Boy’s Life, and the Journal of the American Medical Association—were selling pages 
of advertising. The marketing materials they sent to potential advertisers made it clear 
that they were leasing billboards, not halos.102 Charity publishers also had tin ears for 
the political implications of their actions. After the IRS promulgated regulations 
applying the UBIT to advertising in 1967, they were so outraged by what they felt were 
technically unauthorized regulations and so confident in their political power103 that 
they pressured Congress to hold hearings. Their technical arguments did not impress 
Congress. The obviously unrelated nature of their advertising businesses, however, did. 
The hearings seem to have been lost as soon as the American Medical Association’s 
(AMA) representative claimed that AMA journals’ advertising was all related to the 
AMA’s exempt purpose. He found himself lamely defending plainly unrelated ads by 
arguing to openly sarcastic Congressmen that soap “is an important therapeutic agent,” 
“Coca Cola is used therapeutically,” and “soup is a nutritional item which certainly is 
important in prescribing at times for certain types of patients.”104 Other exempt 
organizations made hapless “destination of income” arguments, apparently unaware 
                                                                                                                 
 
 100. See supra text accompanying note 19. 
 101. Clear Channel and Viacom, for instance, put their trademarks on billboards they own, 
but advertisers do not pay for association with those brands. See, e.g., Clear Channel 
Commc’ns, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 32 (Mar. 10, 2006), available at http://www. 
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/739708/000095013406004754/d33838e10vk.htm (“Generally, our 
[billboard] advertising rates are based on the ‘gross rating points,’ or total number of 
impressions delivered expressed as a percentage of a market population, of a display or group of 
displays. The number of ‘impressions’ delivered by a display is measured by the number of 
people passing the site during a defined period of time . . . .”). 
 102. See, e.g., National Geographic, Advertisement, Editorial Muscle, MADISON AVENUE, 
Jan. 1967 (touting circulation size and growth and high renewal rate to attract advertisers). 
 103. The organizations involved were not political lightweights. The National Chamber of 
Commerce, National Geographic, and the Boy Scouts of America were among the most 
prominent. Opposing them was a group of well organized, but small and dreary, trade 
publishers. 
 104. See Hearings on the Tax Reform Act of 1969 Before the House Comm. On Ways and 
Means, 91st Cong. 1331 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Hearings] (statement of Bernard D. Hirsh, 
American Medical Association). 
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that the UBIT had defeated that doctrine twenty years earlier.105 Many organizations 
followed the example of their predecessors in 1950.106 They could see that a general 
exemption for commercial advertising income was politically untenable, and argued for 
provisions crafted to minimize the tax on their own income.107 
The clear political logic of taxing advertising does not apply well, however, to 
sponsor acknowledgements. Initially, the argument seems clear. Assertions by 
Congress and the IRS that “mere” acknowledgements of a sponsor have no commercial 
value are fantasy. Those active in nonprofit fundraising and business sponsorship 
admit, in candid moments, that most businesses and many individuals who seek 
sponsor acknowledgements place significant value on them and pay for that value.108 
Nor is the value provided too intangible to value. Professional athletes and entertainers 
pay tax on the revenue they receive from their sponsors. The value they provide their 
sponsors is no more tangible than that provided by a tax-exempt organization. We 
simply assume that the amount a sponsor is willing to pay the athlete or entertainer, 
after arm’s-length negotiation, is good evidence of the value of the intangible benefit 
provided in exchange for that payment. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 105. The charitable tax exemption applies only to organizations organized and operated 
“exclusively” for exempt purposes. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Prior to passage of the UBIT in 
1950, a number of courts had held that the exclusivity requirement applied to the manner in 
which an organization used its funds (the “destination” of its income), rather than the activities 
it engaged in to raise funds (the “source” of the income). See Stone, supra note 5, at 1485. The 
UBIT overruled this doctrine. See id. at 1485–87. 
 106. See Stone, supra note 5, at 1543–44 (discussing the failure of charities to defend the 
application of exemption to unrelated business income). 
 107. These exceptions ranged from the relatively principled attempt to exempt advertising 
that was screened to have some relation to the organization’s exempt purpose, to the Boy 
Scouts’ suggestion that only organizations chartered by Congress (i.e., the Boy Scouts) should 
be exempt. See, e.g., 1969 Hearings, supra note 104, at 1071-73 (statement of John M. Lumley, 
National Education Association); id. at 1224 (statement of John C. Fontaine, Boy Scouts of 
America). 
 108. See Becker-Olsen & Simmons, supra note 64; Colombo, supra note 78; Crimmins & 
Horn, supra note 62, at 11; Knauer, Paradox, supra note 65, at 60–81; Mara Janis, The Halo 
Effect, ADWEEK, May 22, 2000, at 88; Meryl Paula Gardner & Philip Joel Shuman, 
Sponsorship: An Important Component of the Promotions Mix, J. OF ADVERTISING, VOL. 16, 
1987, at 11; Stipp & Schiavone, supra note 65, at 22. In commenting on the Audit Guidelines, 
John Hyde, of the Dallas Methodist Hospitals Foundation, estimated with respect to eighty 
percent of potential sponsors that 
[t]heir employees and directors regularly remind one another of their fiduciary 
responsibilities to the corporation and its owners. Volunteers and employees of 
non-profit organizations must persuade the corporation’s employees and directors 
that supporting their organization is in the corporation’s best interest. Their 
strongest means of persuasion exist in providing positive exposure for the 
corporation. Generally speaking, marketing, advertising, and public affairs 
departments have the largest budgets for corporate sponsorships and contributions. 
When a marketing staff person receives little justification (little or no promotion or 
exposure) the answer to a charitable request is no. 
John Hyde, Comments of Dallas Methodist Hospitals Foundation, 5 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 
935, 935 (1992). 
2007] TAXATION OF CHARITABLE SPONSORSHIPS 237 
 
On careful consideration, however, sponsor acknowledgements begin to look very 
different from advertising in two ways that impact on the political symbolism at the 
root of the exemption—expression of support for charitable activities.109 First, many 
sponsor acknowledgements are not commercial in nature. Second, even commercial 
acknowledgements, by their very nature, are efforts to mimic genuine support for 
popular charitable endeavors. 
The first way in which commercial sponsorships differ from pure advertisements is 
pragmatic:  Some acknowledgements are sold in commercial sponsorship transactions, 
but many are simply an expected part of a gratuitous gift.110 Bona fide charitable 
donations followed by public acknowledgements could not be more different from the 
purchase of advertising within the context of the exemption. These acknowledgements 
reflect the same symbolic support for charitable activities that supports the exemption. 
We would therefore expect any attempt to deter them by imposing the UBIT to run into 
political trouble. 
The above argument applies only to acknowledgements of gratuitous gifts, but the 
line between transfers motivated by the promise of an acknowledgement and ones 
made in mere expectation of an acknowledgement can easily blur. A blurry rule that 
turns largely on subjective goals and motives poses a serious evidentiary problem. 
Practical application is likely to turn on objective facts that raise presumptions about 
motivation. Viewed in this light, it is easier to understand the IRS’s early rulings, 
presuming sponsor acknowledgements had no value. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 109. A related but incorrect argument is that sponsorship income is “related” to an exempt 
purpose, within the meaning of the UBIT. The sponsor’s motive in sponsoring a charity is 
related to the charity’s exempt purpose. The business of selling sponsorship rights, however, is 
not itself an exempt-purpose activity in the way selling medical or educational services is. See 
Hill, supra note 4, at 29–31. If a nonprofit organization was formed for the exclusive purpose of 
marketing sponsorship rights, it would not be exempt, even if it only serviced charities. Exempt 
organizations also argued, prior to the passage of 513(i), that sponsorship fees were actually 
royalties on a trademark license, which would be exempt from UBIT. See I.R.C. § 512(b)(2). 
This is a plausible description of certain arrangements. See Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm’r, 77 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1569 (1999) (holding that affinity credit card income was exempt from the 
UBIT). It is tempting to think that the royalty exception in Section 512(b)(2) itself reflects the 
political preference for sponsorships discussed in this subsection. The actual history of the 
exception, however, indicates that Congress intended to exempt mineral rights and royalties 
from university patents, not trademark licensing royalties. See Revenue Revisions, 1947–48: 
Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 80th Cong. 3463–65 (1948) (statement of 
A.W. Peterson, University of Wisconsin, discussing Wisconsin Alumni Research Fund); H. REP. 
NO. 81-2319, at 110 (1950) (specifically mentioning “overriding royalties,” a term used 
principally in the financing of mineral extraction); “Recommended Changes in the Tax 
Treatment of Educational and Charitable Organizations” at 6 (hand-dated Apr. 25, 1949) 
(unsigned, but probably drafted by Laurence Woodworth of the Joint Committee on Internal 
Revenue Taxation staff) (on file at National Archives at College Park, Maryland (NACP), 
Record Group 56, Department of the Treasury, Entry 682, Office of Tax Policy, Subject Files, 
1913-72, HA8 Exempt Organizations, Box 34.2, File EA-1/49.01 – Treasury-Joint Committee 
Staff: Revenue Program for 1949-50) (assuming royalties would arise from “a patent, process or 
natural resource”). 
 110. See supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text. 
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Before sponsorship became a major form of marketing, genuine charitable intent 
was probably a more significant (often overwhelming) motivation for most 
acknowledged donations. There was also no ready market for acknowledgements that 
could be used to value them. Given the probability that donors were not buying 
acknowledgements and the difficulty of valuing them, a rule deeming them valueless 
made good practical sense. Some transactions might be improper, but the government 
could expect much trouble and little benefit from trying to find and challenge those 
transactions. This calculation is probably still true in the context of individual 
donations. 
By the late 1980s, however, it became apparent to the IRS that the first, pragmatic 
distinction between sponsor acknowledgements and advertisements was no longer a 
good justification for ignoring business sponsorships of charities. Certain charities 
were unambiguously selling sponsor acknowledgements at high prices. The IRS’s 
initial reaction was to abandon its earlier presumption. 
The second difference between sponsor acknowledgements and pure advertisements 
quickly became clear to the IRS when it abandoned its initial, pragmatic, approach. 
The IRS found that business sponsorships implicate the exemption’s symbolic politics 
in a different manner. To understand the connection between purely instrumental 
sponsorships and genuine support for an exempt purpose, it is worth recalling that the 
principal value of a sponsorship—the halo effect—depends on creating a strong 
association between the sponsor and the sponsored event or organization. Mere 
association is not enough, however. An association will generate a halo effect only if 
the target audience also perceives that the association reflects genuine support.111 The 
result is that the political symbolism of successful business sponsorships of charity is 
very close to that of the genuine donations they simulate. 
To illustrate this point, imagine a church donor who has no subjective enthusiasm 
for the church. She nonetheless makes a large donation to include her name on a 
“Defenders of the Faith” list posted in the foyer. Why? She calculates that other people 
are genuinely enthusiastic about the church and that she might benefit from some of 
that enthusiasm. Perhaps she is targeting potential customers who will be more likely to 
shop at her store if she appears God-fearing.112 Perhaps she aims to influence potential 
jurors in her upcoming criminal trial.113 Perhaps she just wants to fit in socially with 
genuine church supporters. The point is that her calculation, albeit purely instrumental, 
is entirely dependent on genuine enthusiasm. She is instrumentally mimicking the 
uncalculated actions of a genuine enthusiast. Her actions will differ from those of a 
genuine church enthusiast only if she errs in her calculations. She will also be careful 
not to disabuse anyone of the notion that she is genuinely enthusiastic, since that would 
destroy the value of the transaction. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 111. See supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text. 
 112. See, e.g., Pat Beall, Investigators Probe ‘Angel’ Of Orchestra, WALL ST. J., May 8, 
1996, at F1 (discussing the role of a religious image in inducing trust in a fraudulent investment 
advisor). 
 113. See, e.g., Ronald L. Levy, Sponsorship: What’s in It for You?, PUB. RELS. Q., Fall 2004, 
at 42, 42 (2004) (describing the “benefit of public gratitude that protects an entire company—
management, employees and stockholders—when a company is eventually accused of corporate 
wrongdoing, falsely or perhaps not so falsely”); Russell Hubbard, Scrushy’s Charitable 
Donations Continue as Trial Approaches, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Nov. 18, 2003, at 1C. 
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If purely instrumental purchases of charitable acknowledgement reflect, albeit 
indirectly, genuine public enthusiasm for charitable purposes, we should expect 
politicians to view them as close equivalents to gratuitous donations. We might then 
expect attempts to deter them by imposing the UBIT to be problematic. In fact, purely 
instrumental support for charity may be preferable to genuine support in the context of 
the charitable exemption’s symbolic politics. Whereas genuine donations may reflect 
highly idiosyncratic enthusiasms, instrumental support is more likely to flow to 
activities that fit the most popular perceptions of good works. 
Understanding the political forces that disfavor advertising but favor sponsorship 
takes us another step towards understanding Section 513(i). It explains why both the 
IRS and Congress have shown such an aversion to taxing obviously commercial 
sponsorship transactions. Sponsor acknowledgement, like advertising, is charged with 
political symbolism. That symbolism, however, strongly favors sponsor 
acknowledgement. We now have the necessary conceptual basis to reexamine the 
sponsorship controversy as a clash between the nominal policies embodied in 
exemption doctrine and the political symbolism that actually underlies the exemption. 
The triumph of the latter is not a story of IRS cowardice or corruption. Rather, it is the 
story of an agency realizing that symbolic laws cannot be enforced according to 
doctrinal logic alone. 
 
III. REEXAMINING THE SPONSORSHIP CONTROVERSY 
In this Part, I will use the conceptual framework developed in Part II above to 
reexamine the sponsorship controversy. The IRS’s reaction to charities’ objections was 
not the unprincipled concession to political power that critics have assumed. Rather, 
the IRS realized that its initial attempt to deal with sponsorship revenues through the 
distinction between commercial and gratuitous transactions, while doctrinally correct, 
was practically and politically impossible. It then shifted to addressing the problem by 
trying to distinguish between advertising and sponsor acknowledgement. The IRS 
eventually realized (if only intuitively) that the real question in applying the UBIT to 
sponsor acknowledgements is not whether the charity is selling something, but whether 
its activities look like the kind of activities we like to think we are subsidizing through 
the charitable tax exemption. 
Accordingly, the 1993 Regulations were a deliberate attempt to give teeth to the 
distinction between advertising and sponsor acknowledgement. They were structured to 
deal with the ambiguous distinction between advertising and sponsor acknowledgement 
by giving charities strong incentives to stay far away from ambiguous arrangements. 
The IRS never backed down from this position, but Congress did. While the 1993 
Regulations were designed to keep charities far away from advertising, Section 513(i) 
is designed to allow them as close as possible. Nonetheless, Section 513(i) did not 
exempt advertising revenues from the UBIT. Rather, it adopted the 1993 Regulations’ 
distinction between advertising and sponsor acknowledgement, albeit in largely 
symbolic form. Although this distinction had no basis in preexisting UBIT doctrine and 
disfavored charities, it compellingly expressed the governing symbolism. 
 
A. Symbolic Politics and Law Enforcement 
Murray Edelman has described normal administrative enforcement as a kind of 
game that government enforcers and citizens play within the framework of legal rules 
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whose symbolic validity is accepted by all players. No one expects or wants total and 
literal enforcement. The players develop a mutual understanding of enforcement 
tolerance. In the normal situation, however, those who violate the law do not question 
the symbolic values it expresses.114 Thieves generally buy into the idea that thievery 
should be caught and punished, even as they try to evade detection and punishment. 
They are gaming the property system, not rebelling against it. When enforcers proceed 
against them in accordance with the accepted “rules of the game” (e.g., customary 
detection, charging, and plea bargaining practices), they generally do not question the 
legitimacy of the proceedings against them, much as they might resent the result.115 
Under Edelman’s analysis, government officials enforcing a law with symbolic 
importance can run into political trouble for two kinds of over-enforcement. On the 
simplest level, they can mistake the “rules of the game” and enforce too much. Insiders 
in the enforcement game would regard strict and literal enforcement of the law as 
inappropriate “sweating the small stuff.” Thus, a police officer who fines every traffic 
infraction in violation of community understandings can run into political trouble for 
enforcing the law.116 Such an officer would not be told to revise her interpretation of 
the law, but to “get with the program” in her enforcement habits. 
A more difficult problem arises when an enforcer acts on an interpretation allowed 
(or even unequivocally required) by the relevant legal text that contradicts general 
understandings of the law’s symbolic meaning. An insider would not criticize this 
behavior as too picky, but rather as a fundamental perversion of the law. Those who 
argue that the First Amendment should not ban Ten Commandments monuments from 
public buildings, for instance, are generally not protesting their opponents’ picayune 
enforcement or linguistic mistakes. Rather, they begin their Constitutional construction 
with the conviction that a proper reading of the Constitution could not result in a ban 
on wholesome and popular religious expression.117 
 
B. IRS Reaction to Criticism of the Bowl TAMs Revisited 
The IRS’s position in the Bowl TAMs implicated both kinds of over-enforcement: 
first, the IRS appeared to have broken the rules of the “enforcement game” by suddenly 
reversing its previous rulings. This problem was immediately obvious and the IRS’s 
initial reaction was an attempt to convince charities that it was the “big business” 
charities, not the IRS, that had violated the rules by disguising commercial transactions 
                                                                                                                 
 
 114. See MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 44–72 (1964). 
 115. Criminals do not always accept the customary rules of the game as legitimate, but that is 
not the same as questioning the symbolic validity of the law being enforced. For instance, 
people who do not question the validity of traffic laws may nonetheless bitterly resent a 
disproportionate enforcement policy based on the driver’s race. 
 116. See EDELMAN, supra note 114, at 45; WAFF 48 News, For many across the Valley, 
Rogersville is known as a speed trap (Mar. 13, 2006), http://www.waff.com/Global/ 
story.asp?S=4527180 (reporting allegations of a Rogersville, Alabama police officer that he was 
instructed to ticket only out-of-town drivers). 
 117. See, e.g., Silliness in Commandments Debate, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Feb. 
27, 2006, at B7 (describing the opposition to public displays of the Ten Commandments as a 
“ridiculous . . . effort by some malcontents to force any religious expression out of the public 
square”). 
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as gifts. Second, and more subtlely, the IRS’s enforcement of legal doctrine, while 
doctrinally consistent, was incompatible with the symbolic meaning of the exemption 
and the UBIT. The IRS treated sponsorship acknowledgements as advertising because 
it failed to understand that sponsorship arrangements reflect altruistic public support 
for exempt activities, despite the fact that most sponsors are commercially motivated 
when they pay to tap into that public support. Accordingly, neither charities nor 
politicians saw sponsorship support for charities as the kind of incongruous activity 
that the UBIT should deter. The 1993 Regulations and Section 513(i) addressed this 
second problem by abandoning the distinction between gratuitous and commercial 
sponsorships. 
 
1. Initial Reaction: Bowl TAMs and Audit Guidelines 
Going into the controversy, the IRS did think it was engaging in over-enforcement. 
A simple “thank you” would not transform a genuine gift into an unrelated business 
transaction. “Big business” charities, however, had gone well beyond simple thanks. 
They were engaging in quid pro quo sales of marketing services. Section 513(c) 
seemed to express the relevant policy as to such sales. Commercialism in the nonprofit 
sector seemed so obviously inappropriate that the IRS assumed that legitimate charities 
were not engaging in it and would join the IRS in condemning any charities that were.  
Consequently, the Bowl TAMs assumed that the appropriate test was whether the 
transactions were commercial or gratuitous. As discussed, the IRS did not initially vary 
from this approach, even after the controversy began. It simply assumed it had been 
misunderstood.118 The IRS did not think it was repudiating its prior rulings. Rather, it 
argued that “the benefits provided in this case are significantly different from the types 
of donor recognition previously recognized by the Service as insignificant.”119  
Despite the rhetoric of continuity, however, the issue was deeper than novel facts. 
As discussed above, the IRS’s earlier rulings had seemed to apply a conclusive 
presumption that public recognition could not transform a donation into a commercial 
exchange.120 The Bowl TAMs reflected the IRS’s perception that it was facing a new 
phenomenon. The old presumption that sponsor acknowledgements and advertisings 
were distinct no longer seemed safe. Business donors and charities alike were 
emphasizing the instrumental value of sponsor acknowledgements. 
The IRS was correct in thinking that it was facing a changed landscape. What it 
failed to see, at the beginning, was that the change had been occurring for some time 
and was nearly complete. The IRS rendered its early rulings at the beginning of a 
general business trend toward treating sponsorship as a marketing strategy. The trend 
started in the 1970s but accelerated greatly in the 1980s.121 Its most important 
                                                                                                                 
 
 118. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text. 
 119. See Cotton Bowl TAM, supra note 39, at *6. 
 120. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
 121. See Gardner & Shuman, supra note 108, at 11 (comparing twenty-seven percent annual 
growth in sponsorship spending between 1980 and 1985 to twelve percent growth in advertising 
spending); Meenaghan 1991, supra note 62, at 5 (noting increase in worldwide sponsorship 
spending from $2 billion in 1984 to $4.1 billion in 1987); Sandler & Shani, supra note 62, at 9 
(reporting five hundred percent increase in sports sponsorships between 1982 and 1987); 
William L. Shanklin & John R. Kuzma, Buying That Sporting Image: What Senior Executives 
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application was in for-profit professional sports sponsorships, but the same change in 
business attitudes affected nonprofit sponsorships equally. The reason for the change is 
unclear. Commentators who focus on charitable sponsorships have often surmised that 
Reagan-era budget cuts forced charities to be more entrepreneurial.122 Other factors are 
probably more important, however, since the same trend occurred simultaneously and 
on a much larger scale in for-profit sports. Marketing scholars have generally cited the 
increased cost of broadcast media, marketers’ growing acceptance of sponsorships as a 
marketing tool as they became more familiar with it, and the effects of increased 
“clutter” and “ad zapping” on the effectiveness of advertising.123 
Whatever the cause, the change was dramatic. Businesses and sponsored 
organizations had long viewed sponsorships as donations. They justified their 
sponsorships vaguely as attempts to improve their public image. In practice, however, 
business sponsorships often reflected the genuine (but not business-related) interests 
and sympathies of high executives. It is easy to see why the IRS was not interested in 
trying to distinguish between pure philanthropic motives and the largely pretextual 
commercialism of these early sponsorships. 
By the 1980s, companies were removing their sponsorship programs from their 
charity and public relations budgets and placing them into their marketing budgets, 
where expenditures were evaluated more coldly for commercial value.124 The result 
was sponsorship agreements that were more specific about their marketing objectives 
and marketers boasting about their achievements.125 Both caught the IRS’s attention in 
the late 1980s, highlighting the differences between the vague self-interest of 
traditional sponsorship and the specific return-on-investment claims in the new market 
for sponsorships. In a February 1992 meeting of the D.C. Bar, one IRS official 
“analogized charities’ efforts at attracting corporate sponsors to a billboard that read, 
                                                                                                                 
Need to Know About Corporate Sports Sponsorship, MARKETING MGMT., Spring 1992, at 59, 59 
(comparing $3 billion in estimated 1992 U.S. sponsorship spending to $500 million in estimated 
1982 spending). 
 122. See, e.g., 1993 Hearing Transcript, supra note 56, at 5–7 (statement of Mike Berry, 
International Festivals Association); Farbman, supra note 6, at 64–65; Streckfus, EO Office, 
supra note 69, at 787 (quoting James J. McGovern, the IRS Associate Chief Counsel (Employee 
Benefits and Exempt Organizations)). 
 123. See Gardner & Shuman, supra note 108, at 12; Meenaghan 1991, supra note 62, at 5; 
Shanklin & Kuzma, supra note 121, at 59. 
 124. See, e.g., Meenaghan 1991, supra note 62, at 6; Shanklin & Kuzma, supra note 121, at 
60, 64. The transformation has not been complete. A recent survey, for instance, found that 
forty-two percent of responding sponsors made no efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of their 
sponsorships. See Marketers Weigh in on Sponsorship ROI, INCENTIVE, Aug. 2006, at 12 
(reporting IEG survey). 
 125. See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 69 (“‘Philanthropy and patron-of-the-sport days are 
gone,’ says Jack Mahoney, [John Hancock’s] sports marketing consultant. ‘We wanted the 
recognition.’”). The measurement of sponsorship value by exposure time is still popular. See, 
e.g., Barrand, supra note 62, at 17 (quoting an advertising agency executive, noting that “[t]here 
will always be people who equate sponsorship to a media buy because it makes it easier to 
understand”); Joyce Julius & Associates, Team Sponsorships & Partnerships, A SECOND LOOK, 
June 2006, http://www.joycejulius.com/Newsletters/a_second_look__june_2006.htm. 
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‘This space for rent.’”126 Other IRS officials emphasized the importance to their 
internal deliberations of a Harvard Business School case study127 and Wall Street 
Journal article,128 each of which praised John Hancock’s decision to sponsor a bowl 
game as a very efficient ad buy.129 
By the time the IRS focused on “big business” charity sponsorships, the shift was 
well advanced. A wide gap had opened between the IRS’s and the charities’ 
perceptions of the rules of the enforcement game. The stage was set for a crisis. Each 
side was primed to become outraged at the other’s treatment of the same conduct. This 
explains why the Audit Guidelines fell far short of their aims of warning charities away 
from commercial sponsorships and reassuring them that the rules had not changed for 
their usual activities.130 A broad cross-section of charities already considered 
commercial sponsorships to be a normal and unproblematic activity. 
 
2. Reconsideration: 1993 Regulations 
As negative comments poured in from a wide variety of charities,131 the IRS began 
to understand two elements of the new landscape. First, corporate sponsorships were 
already pervasive and pervasively important in the nonprofit sector.132 Second, 
business sponsors were largely, if not exclusively, motivated by sponsorships’ 
commercial value.133 Because exempt organizations knew that corporate sponsors paid 
them largely for valuable services, they correctly perceived that most sponsorship 
arrangements involved the commercialism the IRS was targeting. The IRS thought it 
was sending its auditors to pick a few bad apples out of the barrel. It quickly 
                                                                                                                 
 
 126. Paul Streckfus, Three Recent Gatherings Discuss Corporate Sponsorship Guidelines, 5 
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 196, 197 (1992) (quoting Marcus Owens, Director, IRS Exempt 
Organizations Technical Division). 
 127. See GREYSER & TEOPACO, supra note 69. 
 128. See McCarthy, supra note 69. 
 129. See Spring 1992 Meeting, supra note 69, at 391–92 (remarks of Beth Purcell, Office of 
Chief Counsel (Employee Benefits and Exempt Organizations)); Streckfus, EO Office, supra 
note 69, at 787 (quoting James McGovern, IRS Associate Chief Counsel (Employee Benefits 
and Exempt Organizations)). 
 130. For a discussion of these aims, see supra notes 88–99 and accompanying text. 
 131. Streckfus, Gift, supra note 48, at 179. 
 132. See Audit Net, supra note 94 (reporting widespread concern); Marlis L. Carson, Report 
on the Tenth Annual Nonprofit Organizations Institute, Sponsored by the University of Texas 
School of Law, Held on January 28 & 29, 1993, Reports Compiled by Marlis L. Carson: 
Service’s Beth Purcell Discusses Evolution of Corporate Sponsorship Regulations, 7 EXEMPT 
ORG. TAX REV. 363, 363 (1993) [hereinafter Carson 1993] (“The Service soon discovered a 
problem with this reasoning because the practice of using corporate logos is widespread and not 
just restricted to bowl games, Purcell explained.”); Bertrand M. Harding, Jr., Owens Gives Some 
Comfort to Public Broadcasters on Corporate Sponsorship Income, 6 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 
400, 400 (1992) (reporting statement by Marcus Owens, Director, IRS Exempt Organizations 
Technical Division, that the IRS “does not have a good understanding of how the corporate 
underwriting system [for public broadcasters] operates”); Lipman, supra note 98, at B8 (quoting 
Lesa Ukman, editor of Special Events Report, who stated, “I don’t think the IRS has a clue of 
the ramifications of all of this.”). 
 133. See, e.g., Hyde, supra note 108. 
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discovered that it was sending them out with shotguns and instructions to shoot the 
biggest fish in a crowded barrel. Little fish were understandably nervous. 
The pervasiveness of nongratuitous sponsorships, in and of itself, posed a serious 
problem for the IRS. It is important to note, however, that this problem was not 
necessarily politically insurmountable. Where there is little disagreement about the 
symbolic meaning of a law, it can be sporadically enforced (subject to conventions of 
enforcement tolerance) with little or no political trouble. Income tax enforcement is a 
good example. Tax evasion and avoidance is fairly pervasive, but few insiders in the 
enforcement game would argue that this invalidates the income tax. Most accept that 
selective enforcement, even random enforcement, is valid. If the problem had been of 
this sort, an effort to convince charities that the IRS was not exceeding normal 
enforcement tolerances would probably have worked politically, even if violations 
were rampant. Politicians would have been suitably scandalized by the charities’ 
commercialism, and the offending charities would have sheepishly promised full 
cooperation with the new “regulatory environment.”134 
By late summer 1992, however, the IRS was realizing that it had a deeper problem. 
The Audit Guidelines had increased, rather than quieted, protests by charities. In 
Congress, the IRS’s attempt to isolate obvious abusers from the majority of legitimate 
charities actually seemed to strengthen the targets’ case for persecution. In the fall of 
1992, the IRS’s enforcement initiative seemed to be backfiring. It appeared that the 
IRS’s initiative would miss its original targets completely and hit only charities it 
meant to leave alone.135 The IRS had started with the idea of targeting the advertising 
income of a few commercialized pseudo-charities, but the Audit Guidelines comments 
and hearings had clarified that its efforts would impact “authentic” charities, not just 
“big business” charities. Meanwhile, Congress was passing legislation that was so 
tailored to the interests of college bowl games, the NCAA, and the Olympics that it 
excluded many other charities. Internally, the staff apparently began to question its 
initial assumption that cracking down on commercially motivated sponsorship 
arrangements was either practical or normatively desirable. 
At the same time that the IRS began to realize how difficult a situation it was in, it 
began to see a way out. In commenting on the Audit Guidelines, public broadcasters 
pointed out that the FCC had been dealing with commercialism in sponsorship 
acknowledgements for fifteen years in its licensing rules for public television and radio 
stations.136 The FCC had confronted the issue early, since its rules required 
                                                                                                                 
 
 134. See, e.g., U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial 
Professionals: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Gov’t 
Affairs, 108th Cong. 325 (2003) (submission by Deutsche Bank AG) (“Deutsche Bank 
continuously monitors changes in the law and the regulatory environment and adapts its 
business practices, policies and procedures to comply with the ever-changing legal and 
regulatory environment. Deutsche Bank is cognizant of the Internal Revenue Service’s highly 
publicized tax shelter initiatives and is committed to complying with all applicable rules related 
to tax shelter registration and disclosure.”). 
 135. See James J. McGovern, Service’s McGovern Explains Proposed Corporate 
Sponsorship Regulations, 7 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 381, 381–82 (1993). 
 136. See FCC Rules, supra note 33; Juliann Avakian-Martin, IRS Faces Tough Crowd at 
Hearing on Corporate Sponsorship Guidelines, 6 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 370, 370–71 (1992) 
(reporting questioning by Marcus Owens, Director, IRS Exempt Organizations Technical 
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broadcasters to identify their sponsors in the name of openness. The FCC’s rules for 
nonprofit broadcasters (“FCC Rules”) therefore allowed sponsor identification but 
prohibited promotion of a sponsor’s products and services. The FCC’s approach, 
though itself not without controversy, had several practical advantages. It was 
established and had been endorsed by Congress.137 It had proven workable for public 
broadcasters. Finally, public broadcasters would support it, since they were already 
living with it and did not want two inconsistent regulatory regimes. 
The public broadcasters brought up the FCC Rules as a special pleading, not a 
general solution. They argued that any acknowledgement that comported with the FCC 
Rules should suffice for UBIT purposes, because the FCC forced them to acknowledge 
sponsors and Congress had expressly blessed “enhanced underwriting” sponsor 
acknowledgements.138 At the Audit Guidelines hearings, however, the IRS and 
representatives of other charities were already considering a broader use of the FCC 
approach.139 A few months later, the IRS issued the 1993 Regulations, adopting the 
FCC’s distinction between acknowledgement and promotion. Carefully chosen 
examples reassured college sports, street festivals, performing arts organizations, and 
other key critics of the IRS’s original approach that they had little to fear.140 The 
shooting war was over. 
Critics quickly labeled the 1993 Regulations an unprincipled capitulation to 
political pressure.141 The charge was unfair, but understandable. The critics noticed 
that the IRS had abandoned the distinction between commercial and gratuitous 
transactions. Existing doctrine seemed to require this distinction. A rule that would 
exempt the most egregious violators seemed, therefore, to be a craven retreat from 
enforcing the law. 
                                                                                                                 
Division, regarding appropriateness and provisions of FCC rules); Carson 1993, supra note 132, 
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 141. See Knauer, Influence, supra note 4, at 1031; Sheppard, supra note 4; Streckfus, Gift, 
supra note 48. 
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The IRS understood (if only intuitively) what its critics missed:  Enforcement 
agencies are granted enforcement discretion not only to prioritize limited public 
resources, but also to assure that literal enforcement does not go beyond the symbolic 
legitimacy of the rules they are enforcing. The IRS did not abandon enforcing the 
UBIT’s limits on the charitable exemption; it abandoned a doctrine that, taken literally, 
led beyond the UBIT’s symbolic reach. It called off literal enforcement of existing 
doctrine, but only in favor of a new rule designed to place real limits on charities’ 
activities. The tainting rule denied automatic tax-exempt treatment to any arrangement 
that combined elements of both advertising and sponsorship.142 
When the IRS proposed the 1993 Regulations, it explained that it was attempting to 
fix a “clear line” that both the IRS and charities would find easier than the muddy 
distinction between gratuitous and commercial transactions.143 Charities praised the 
proposal on the same basis.144 It is hard to take these claims seriously. As discussed 
above, the distinction between advertising and sponsor acknowledgement is at least as 
ambiguous as the rule it displaced.145 The IRS implicitly recognized the ambiguity by 
including the tainting rule, as did the charities by opposing it.  
Under the tainting rule, the charities were hoist on their own petard. The IRS had 
adopted the ambiguous distinction they favored, but had burdened them with most of 
the risk of the ambiguity. A charity that sold advertising and acknowledged a 
sponsorship could still try to bifurcate its services, but it had no assurance any of them 
would be exempt. The rule gave charities a strong incentive to keep their sponsor 
acknowledgements as pure as possible. 
Accordingly, the charities argued against the tainting rule.146 Although they often 
said they were looking for clarity, they were really seeking ambiguity. They were 
content with the IRS’s admission that selling sponsor acknowledgement on an openly 
quid pro quo basis was not an unrelated business per se. After that, all they needed was 
the right to minimize and cabin any taxable revenue from services that crossed the 
fuzzy line.147 The right to bifurcate revenue would put the IRS in such an unfavorable 
position that a well-planned deal could be effectively bulletproof. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 142. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 143. See Marlis L. Carson, Corporate Sponsorship Regs Provide ‘Clear Line’ for IRS, 
Charities, Says Owens, 7 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 917 (1993) (acknowledging that the 1993 
Regulations “permit exposure that would ordinarily be considered advertising” in favor of a 
“clear line”). 
 144. At the hearings on the regulations, for instance, Marilyn Mohrman-Gillis, representing 
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 145. See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. 
 146. For example, Henry Morris, Jr., of the American Heart Association, commented, 
“Because the final regulations implemented by the IRS will explicitly define what constitutes 
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 147. See, e.g., id. at 17–20 (statement of Pete Scott, Coopers & Lybrand). 
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3. Resolution: Section 513(i) 
As discussed above, however, the IRS refused to abandon its position. The charities 
had to return to Congress for legislation that resolved the controversy in their favor.148 
Although Section 513(i) appeared to follow the 1993 Regulations, it was actually an 
end-run around them.149 It gave the charities the ambiguity they wanted:  It eliminated 
the tainting rule. It also replaced the 1993 Regulations’ functional test for advertising 
with a short list of examples, leaving the treatment of any message outside those 
examples highly ambiguous. 
Does Section 513(i) then represent the capitulation the standard story describes? 
Again, the standard story falls short and for the same reason. If Congress was simply 
giving “big business” charity's lobbyists what they were seeking, why not return to the 
express exemption of advertising revenue it had passed in 1992?150 That language was 
reintroduced in a 1995 bill that died in committee.151 That same year, Congress passed 
language that eventually became Section 513(i).152 It adopted the 1993 Regulations’ 
distinction between advertising and sponsorship and insisted on excepting periodical 
advertisements, thus preserving the original purpose and function of Section 513(c). 
A cynic would say that canny lobbyists and members of Congress left a hollow tax 
on advertising to provide political cover for a sellout. I assume this is true, but it begs 
the question. Why was political cover necessary, and how did a nominal tax on 
advertising provide it? In thinking about this question, it is important to remember that 
maintaining the appearance of taxing advertising is not costless to charities. Section 
513(i)’s distinction between advertising and sponsorship imposes expensive 
compliance costs on charities, even though it no longer promises the government any 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text. 
 149. See supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text. 
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significant revenue or restraint on commercialism.153 In 2004, for instance, the Nokia 
Sugar Bowl reported $21,500 out of approximately $800,000 in sponsorship revenue 
as unrelated business income.154 The Capital One Bowl reported no unrelated business 
income, but reported spending $124,693 in professional fees, at least some of which 
presumably went to assuring that its sponsorship arrangements were not taxable.155 
Both organizations probably would prefer the vetoed 1992 law under which all their 
sponsorship revenue was simply exempt. This point was not lost on the charities’ 
representatives.156 
 
C. Reinterpreting the Shift from Taxing Commercialism to Taxing Advertising 
If the shift to distinguishing between advertising and sponsor acknowledgement was 
not a capitulation, what was it? I propose that the actions of the IRS and Congress are 
much easier to understand if we view the problem in terms of political symbolism. The 
IRS, the charities, and Congress liked the distinction between advertising and sponsor 
acknowledgement because it fit the symbolic role of the UBIT in deterring activities 
that undermine the exemption.157 It shifted the question to what it should be within the 
political symbolism of the UBIT: not whether the charity is selling something, but 
whether its activities look like the kind of activities we like to think we are subsidizing 
through the charitable tax exemption. As discussed above, commercial sponsor 
acknowledgements are nothing like advertising from this perspective.158 Advertising is 
exactly the kind of activity the UBIT is designed to deter. A commercially successful 
charity sponsorship, by contrast, is one that makes us feel the sponsor genuinely 
supports the charity’s exempt activities. It is favored by the politics of the exemption. 
The IRS had misperceived both the pervasiveness and the political meaning of 
commercial sponsorships when it began the controversy. Once it caught on, however, 
the IRS’s reaction was so politically astute that it completely supplanted earlier and 
cruder legislative attempts to serve the narrow interests of the IRS’s targets. Section 
513(i) is a gutted version of the 1993 Regulations. It is almost purely symbolic 
legislation. The charities, however, applauded the symbolism and Congress kept it, 
despite its obvious costs. The important lesson is that the symbolic function of the 
UBIT is still politically potent. This lesson has been lost not only on critics of the 1993 
                                                                                                                 
 
 153. It also places outer limits on the services a charity can offer tax-free. I assume 
compliance looms larger than any actual economic effect, since Section 513(i) allows charities 
to allocate payments, and sponsors do not mainly want pure advertising services from charities. 
In fact, I assume that charities had some such calculation in mind when they supported the 1993 
Regulations (but opposed the tainting rule) and later welcomed Section 513(i). 
 154. See Sugar Bowl, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, Form 990, Part VII 
Line 93 & Stmt. 13 (2004), available at http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2005/720/272/ 
2005-720272830-021e789d-9.pdf. It presumably had sufficient expenses to offset this income 
and owed no tax 
 155. See Capital One Bowl Form 990, supra note 27, at Stmt. 2. 
 156. See Edited Transcript of the July 31, 1998 ABA Exempt Organizations Committee 
Meeting, 22 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 75, 97–99 (1998) (comments of Celia Roady). 
 157. For a discussion of the function of the UBIT, see supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra notes 109–113 and accompanying text. 
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Regulations and Section 513(i). As will be discussed below, the charities also missed it 
and may have obtained an unstable victory as a result. 
 
IV. CONSTRUCTING THE LEGAL RULE TO DISTINGUISH  
ADVERTISING FROM SPONSORSHIP 
As discussed above, the functional continuum between advertising and sponsorship 
generates a corresponding political continuum in the context of the exemption and the 
UBIT. Part IV considers the implications of this continuum for designing a legal rule to 
distinguish advertising from sponsorship and uses it to understand Section 513(i). In 
Subpart A, I set out the conceptual test suggested by the continuum for distinguishing 
taxable advertising revenue from exempt sponsorship revenue: predominance of effect. 
I then discuss practical considerations that militate against this conceptual test as an 
operative legal rule. In Subpart B, I reconsider Section 513(i) in this light and 
demonstrate that it is inherently unstable because it continuously tempts charities into 
politically dangerous activities. In Subpart C, I consider the possibility of a workable 
safe-harbor rule. 
 
A. A Conceptual Rule and Practical Complications 
At the extremes on the continuum between advertising and sponsorship, it is easy to 
apply the charitable exemption and the UBIT. Selling advertising pages in National 
Geographic, although theoretically within the exemption’s policy of subsidizing 
charity, is taxed under the UBIT because of its undesirable symbolism. Conversely, 
selling a pure sponsor acknowledgement, although theoretically within the UBIT’s rule 
of deterring unrelated business activities, is not taxed under the UBIT because it poses 
no symbolic problems. A pure sponsor acknowledgement reflects strong and genuine, 
if indirect, support for the sponsored organization’s exempt activities. Real business 
sponsorships are rarely so easy. They fall in a blurred zone between advertising and 
sponsor acknowledgements where conflicting political inclinations meet.159 
A legal rule to deal with the mixed cases presented by the real world could use one 
of four approaches. The first approach is a piecemeal test: if elements of advertising 
and sponsor acknowledgement mix, allocate the payment between them and apply the 
UBIT to the advertising portion. This is the approach adopted in Section 513(i). 
Ironically, it was also the approach initially adopted by the IRS (before it realized that 
it was dealing with a highly ambiguous conceptual distinction). The second approach is 
an in terrorem rule:  If any advertising is present, apply the UBIT to the entire 
                                                                                                                 
 
 159. For instance, when Maryland Public Television fired Louis Rukeyser from his 
longstanding position as host of Wall $treet Week, Rukeyser quickly arranged to air an identical 
program on CNBC, which would then make the program available for rebroadcast on public 
television stations at nominal cost. Rukeyser brought most of the sponsors of the PBS program 
with him to CNBC, and CNBC was willing to air the sponsor acknowledgements in a format 
that would meet the FCC and IRS rules for public television. See Philip Kennicott, ‘Wall 
Street’s’ Shortcut Back Home, WASH. POST, July 12, 2002, at C7. Apparently, a purely 
commercial broadcaster was satisfied with the prices sponsors were willing to pay for 
“acknowledgements.” 
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arrangement.160 This is the approach adopted in the 1993 Regulations. The third 
approach is a predominance test:  If elements of advertising and sponsor 
acknowledgement mix, allocate the payment between them and apply the UBIT to the 
advertising portion.  It should be noted that the threshold for “predominance” in such a 
rule could mean anything from slightly more important to overwhelmingly 
predominant. The fourth approach is a safe harbor:  If elements of advertising and 
sponsor acknowledgement mix, exempt the entire arrangement from the UBIT, if it 
meets certain clear but arbitrary tests that tend to indicate the predominance of 
sponsorship over advertising. 
It should be noted that each of these approaches deals in different ways with the 
ambiguity of distinguishing between advertising and sponsor acknowledgement. The 
first and third ignore the ambiguity. The legal treatment of a given arrangement 
depends on a precise application of an inherently imprecise test. The resulting rule is 
difficult to apply, requiring the careful consideration of as many facts as are available. 
It is also largely unpredictable in many cases. As noted above, this explains why 
charities lobbied for Section 513(i), but not a predominance test.161 By placing the 
burden of an ambiguous and fact-intensive case on the IRS, while cabining the cost of 
any taxpayer loss, Section 513(i) puts nearly all the risks of ambiguity on the IRS. This 
deters enforcement in all but the most egregious cases. 
The second and fourth approaches both try to avoid the ambiguity of the underlying 
distinction. The in terrorem rule does this by making the consequences of ambiguous 
facts so drastic that planners will shy away from ambiguous arrangements. This 
strategy helps the government by shooing taxpayers away from creating ambiguous 
facts. It does not, however, benefit the taxpayer. Not surprisingly, the IRS was 
comfortable with the 1993 Regulations and the charities were staunchly opposed. The 
charities did not want to confine themselves to unambiguous sponsor 
acknowledgements and saw no reason they should have to do so. In the end, Congress 
was sympathetic for the same reason the charities were unabashed:  One pole of the 
advertising-sponsorship continuum pulls harder. Politicians are eager to support 
popular charities.162 Politicians are also eager to pummel charities that embarrass them 
by engaging in uncharitylike business.163 When forced to choose, however, they like 
supporting popular organizations more than they like pummeling commercial 
nonprofits.164 
When sponsorship and advertising mix, the advertising involved will rarely be 
easily separable from the sponsorship. Rather, the advertising is often designed to 
emphasize or otherwise exploit the sponsor’s association with the sponsored 
organization or event. Both the sponsor and the charity have a strong incentive to 
assure that sponsorships, including any associated advertising, convey a strong 
impression of genuine support. Sponsors’ efforts to convince their target audiences to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 160. I am not assuming that all sponsor acknowledgements would be taxable under the 
UBIT, but that some would be arguably taxable in the absence of special treatment. 
 161. See supra notes 146–147 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra notes 108–113 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra notes 19, 100–107 and accompanying text. 
 164. As noted supra note 6, this was essentially the NCAA’s response to recent 
Congressional inquiries into the basis for granting a tax exemption to popular college sports:  
We are exempt because we are popular with members of Congress and their constituents. 
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confer the halo of charity can also convince the charities’ target audiences (e.g., 
Congress). The success of sponsorships in conveying the desired impression tends to 
tip the political balance toward sponsorship in mixed cases until the elements of 
sponsorship are negligible and the arrangement approaches pure advertising. 
The fourth approach—a safe-harbor rule—was never suggested during the debate. 
A well-designed safe harbor grants taxpayers certainty as to a range of transactions that 
are, in any case, likely to receive favorable treatment under a facts-and-circumstances 
analysis. Safe harbors are common in tax legislation and regulation.165 They benefit 
both taxpayers and the government. Taxpayers gain because they can plan with 
certainty. The government gains because it has lower enforcement costs:  The cases it 
gives up (questionable transactions within the safe harbor) are best abandoned, since 
they would be marginal and expensive to pursue. Meanwhile, overall enforcement 
becomes easier as most taxpayers cluster within the safe harbor, allowing the IRS to 
concentrate on a smaller number of more egregious violators.166 
It is not clear how the charities would have responded if the IRS had proposed a 
true safe harbor, rather than an in terrorem rule, in the 1993 Regulations. It is possible 
that such a rule would have offered enough benefits to charities that they would have 
accepted significant restraints. I will discuss the possible practicality of such a rule 
below. For now, however, it is enough to observe that the charities’ response was 
entirely understandable, given the rule the IRS proposed. In essence, the IRS proposed 
to take away all ambiguous cases (and many unambiguous ones) with no corresponding 
benefit of certainty. The charities responded by reclaiming all ambiguous cases with 
almost no corresponding danger of uncertainty. 
This analysis leads to one other observation about Section 513(i): It is not a pure 
piecemeal approach. While it leaves the distinction between advertising and sponsor 
acknowledgement largely to the imagination, it also contains a list of examples that are 
deemed unambiguous advertising.167 This adds what I will call a “dangerous-harbor” 
rule.168 As the name suggests, a dangerous-harbor rule is the opposite of a safe harbor. 
It establishes certainty of violation as to a range of transactions that are, in any case, 
likely violations under a facts-and-circumstances analysis. In the case of Section 
513(i), the kinds of blatant sales promotion messages described in the examples would 
likely fail a facts-and-circumstances test for “mere acknowledgement.” Where the 
sponsored organization delivers the sponsor’s overt sales message, the halo effect of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 165. To give an example, shareholders may treat distributions in partial liquidation of the 
incorporated business as capital gains, not dividends. See I.R.C. § 302(b)(4). A distribution 
qualifies as a partial liquidation, however, only if it is “not essentially equivalent to a dividend.” 
See id. § 302(e)(1). The Code then adds a safe harbor to this indeterminate standard. Section 
302(e)(2) provides that a distribution is included in (e)(1) if it “is attributable to the distributing 
corporation’s ceasing to conduct, or consists of the assets of, a qualified trade or business” and 
the distributing corporation continues a “qualified trade or business” after the distribution. For 
another example, see Rev. Proc. 77-37 § 3.01, 1977-2 C.B. 568 (listing minimum numerical 
requirements for advance rulings under I.R.C. § 368). 
 166. Returning to the example of I.R.C. § 302(e)(2), the safe harbor cedes little revenue. The 
vast majority of cases covered by it would satisfy the facts and circumstances test. It is valuable 
to taxpayers, however, to know that a common set of facts will be safely within the rule. 
 167. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 168. My thanks to Dan Klerman for coining this phrase. 
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association is likely to be purely secondary to the billboard effect of conveying an 
overt sales message.  
For all that Section 513(i) is a dangerous harbor in form, however, its harbor is not 
very dangerous. Without the tainting rule, if a charity puts a toe over the line, only the 
toe is at risk (and, practically speaking, only if it is a big enough toe to justify 
significant enforcement costs). Still, like the retained tax on advertising, the dangerous 
harbor list of messages deemed to constitute advertising is not costless to charities. Its 
presence in Section 513(i) is therefore further evidence that the symbolic politics of the 
UBIT were still alive in 1997. 
 
B. Dangerous Safety: The Inherent Political Instability of Section 513(i) 
As discussed above, Section 513(i)’s dangerous-harbor tax on advertising provides 
evidence that the political forces underlying the UBIT are not dead. For the moment, 
however, those forces are quiescent. Section 513(i) makes only the barest of symbolic 
nods in their direction. Its apparent safety for charities is deceptive, however. By 
reducing the taxation of advertising revenue to a symbolic veneer, Section 513(i) may 
face future political instability. 
It stands to reason that sponsors will pay more for commercial messages if there are 
fewer restrictions on their nature and format.169 Sponsors want to rent halos, but they 
are willing to pay extra for the use of any available billboards for their promotional 
messages. The practices (and occasional statements) of exempt organizations bear this 
out.170 The result is pressure on exempt organizations to crowd the line demarcating the 
dangerous harbor. Adding to the temptation, Section 513(i) is designed to limit the 
financial consequences of straying across the line.171 While Section 513(i) limits the 
financial risk of this tendency, it does not limit the political risk. 
If the principal political purpose of the UBIT is to direct exempt organizations away 
from defined politically problematic activities, a rule that invites organizations to 
crowd the dangerous harbor line is politically perilous. Because Section 513(i)’s 
dangerous harbor rule tempts exempt organizations to push the outer limits of the 
public’s perception of charity, it invites a political reaction. A traditional safe-harbor 
rule would produce the same tendency to crowd the line, but the line would not be 
politically dangerous. The taxpayer who strays out of a safe harbor is usually still safe 
(and politically acceptable). The taxpayer who strays into a dangerous harbor is in 
automatic trouble. Since Section 513(i) constantly tempts charities to sell sponsorships 
as close as possible to the dangerous-harbor line, it presents the constant risk that a 
large number of charities (or a few high-profile ones) will concurrently cross the line. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 169. It does not necessarily follow, however, that they will not pay enough for a restricted 
format to satisfy even a commercial broadcaster. See supra note 159. 
 170. For example, PBS used focus groups to determine if viewers would tolerate the addition 
of corporate mascots to sponsor acknowledgement spots in children’s shows, presumably 
because sponsors were willing to pay more if they could get their mascots on television. It 
turned out that viewers were willing to accept stationary mascots but felt that animated ones 
were incompatible with the noncommercial brand image of public television. See Karen 
Everhart, Corporate Mascots (Still as Rocks) and Celebs to Appear in Sponsor Credits, 
CURRENT, July 8, 2002, available at http://www.current.org/cm/cm0212pbs.html. 
 171. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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Such a noticeable foray into the nearly pure advertising might spark the kind of 
political reaction that created the UBIT in 1950 and expanded its scope in 1969. 
It is sometimes observed that Congress has amended the UBIT a number of times 
since 1950 to protect one or another unrelated business in which charities wanted to 
engage.172 The intended conclusion is that the UBIT is a political dead letter; charities 
have the political power to counter any real attempt to enforce it. The conclusion is 
tempting, but shortsighted. It is something like observing that a volcanic island erodes 
steadily into the sea and concluding that it can only get smaller. Erosion is an easily 
observed, daily occurrence. The last volcanic eruption may have happened before 
living memory. Ignoring the eruptions, however, leads to a flawed understanding of the 
island and its probable future. It is important to understand the intermittent but 
powerful force that raised it above sea level in the first place. If that force is still active, 
a single eruption tomorrow could replace thousands of years of erosion. As discussed 
above, Section 513(i) seems to demonstrate that the symbolic political force that 
produced the UBIT in 1950 and expanded it in 1969 may be dormant, but is not 
extinct.173 It is therefore dangerous to assume that it will never again become 
significant.174 
The timing and nature of the political reaction (if it ever comes) are difficult to 
predict. Section 513(i) tempts charities into practices that raise persistent, low-level 
dissent, but there is no current sign of serious political trouble.175 The forces of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 172. See, e.g., McGovern, supra note 135, at 382 (“We could have sat back and let corporate 
sponsorship become the latest addition to the piecemeal repeal of UBIT.”); Stokeld, supra note 
150, at 383. Arthur Andersen seemed to be making a similar point in a 1992 lobbying 
memorandum to the IRS staff. The memorandum dwells on previous IRS attempts to apply the 
UBIT to bingo games and booth rentals at trade shows, both of which ended when Congress 
passed amendments to the UBIT to exempt the specific revenues in question. See Memorandum 
from Rachelle Bernstein, Arthur Andersen & Co., to Terrill A. Hyde, Tax Legislation Counsel, 
Dep’t of the Treasury (Feb. 6, 1992), available at Arthur Andersen Advocates Clarification of 
College Bowl Income Rules, 5 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 445 (1992). The memorandum 
characterizes these amendments as evidence that the UBIT does not apply to any activity the 
IRS cannot show to be in actual competition with a taxable business. Given that neither of the 
cited amendments added such a requirement, the real message was presumably that the IRS’s 
efforts were futile, because the charities had enough clout in Congress to get a special UBIT 
exception for their sponsorship revenues. 
 173. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 did not merely add Section 513(c) to the Code. It also 
expanded the tax on debt-financed income and extended the UBIT to cover churches and other 
tax-exempt organizations. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172 §§ 121(a)(1)–(3), 
(d)(1), (3)(A)–(B), 83 Stat. 487, 543–548. 
 174. The recent criticism of commercialism in college sports, discussed supra note 6, is good 
evidence that the forces that created the UBIT are still with us. The mere fact that pundits and 
politicians alike find the rhetoric attractive is significant, whatever one thinks about the chance 
it will result in real change. 
 175. See, e.g., Sarah McBride, Mixed Messages: As Sponsorship Sales Blossom, Public 
Radio Walks a Fine Line, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2006, at A1 (citing listener complaints that 
public radio has been commercialized and commercial radio operator complaints of unfair 
competition for advertising revenues). See also the discussion supra note 6 of recent ferment in 
the media and Congress over college sports. For the moment, it does not appear that this 
criticism represents the kind of political momentum necessary to overcome the popularity of 
college sports (much less charities in general), but it is hard to predict the outcome. 
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political inertia and entrenched interest politics are strong. An event of sufficient force 
to jar loose their grip on exemption policy may never come. Presumably it would take 
a scandal or some other precipitating event to convert scattered discomfort into 
legislative action. Section 513(i) seems safe for the foreseeable future, but the future is 
notoriously unforeseeable.176 
The event that precipitated Section 513(c) in 1969 was, ironically, the charities’ 
insistence that Congress hold hearings. Ignoring the politics of the UBIT, they were 
confident that they could best the taxmen and the trade journal publishers with a 
combination of technicality and political clout. They miscalculated the politics, 
technicalities fell away, and the hearings became a rout. That particular scenario will 
probably never repeat itself (in the 1990s, charities sought legislative relief without 
hearings), but lawmakers call their own hearings when events make them sufficiently 
uneasy.177 The political potential for such a turning point is ever-present and Section 
513(i) tempts charities into the behavior that might precipitate it. 
 
C. The Possibility of a Safe Harbor 
If the status quo is shaken, the event that shakes it will determine the most likely 
response. If history is any guide, if charities act in ways that do not meet politicians’ 
views of charity, politicians will react by banning the specific actions that bother 
them.178 To give a simple hypothetical, imagine a network of public radio stations that 
succeeded in growing to the point that it was noticeably competing with struggling for-
profit networks.179 Its competitors and potential competitors might react by trying to 
rile up public anger at the so-called nonprofit, living off of both rich ad revenues and 
hard-earned tax dollars. A head of political steam could easily build if enough 
politicians were either pressured by public opinion, persuaded with campaign 
contributions, or simply attracted to the theme (out of personal ideology or a 
calculation of constituent ideology). Since those stoking the controversy would have a 
narrow goal (shutting down a competitor), the resulting legislation would probably be 
restricted to radio stations (or even particular radio stations). 
In the absence of a clear understanding of the problem’s source, such a fly-swatting 
response is almost inevitable. It is not, however, the only possible or best response. A 
more stable solution would be to substitute a true safe-harbor rule that would allow 
                                                                                                                 
 
 176. “It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.” Yogi Berra. It is possible 
that the anger over the extraordinary pay packages recently granted to a few high-profile college 
sports coaches could provide the impetus for Congress to act. See, e.g., Richard Wolf, Athletic 
Spending Under Fire in Senate, USA TODAY, Jan. 5, 2007, at 9C. 
 177. See, e.g., Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from Happening to Good 
Charities: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. (2004); Thomas W. Joo, 
Legislation and Legitimation: Congress and Insider Trading in the 1980s, 82 IND. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=885203& 
high=%20thomas%20joo (abstract) (describing symbolic role of Congressional hearings on 
insider trading). As noted, supra note 6, Senator Grassley has been calling for hearings on the 
tax exemption of college sports. 
 178. See Stone, supra note 5 (describing the 1950 UBIT and 1969 amendments as such 
responses). 
 179. See, e.g., McBride, supra note 175. 
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politically popular sponsorships to proceed on commercial terms while staying well 
clear of pure advertising. The purpose of this Subpart is to lay down the design 
principles and sketch out a few possible contours of such a safe harbor. 
In addressing this question, it is important to reemphasize that Section 513(i) in its 
current form is consistent with the basic politics of the exemption and the UBIT. The 
problem with exempting revenues from commercial sponsorships is not, as some have 
indicated, that it is indefensible as a matter of basic UBIT policy or even that it may 
leave questionable revenues exempt.180 As discussed above, Section 513(i) represents a 
political decision to give the benefit of the doubt to certain sponsorships because 
political preferences for protecting sponsorship outweigh political distaste for charities 
engaging in unrelated business activities.181 The problem is that Section 513(i) is 
unstable and might thus eventually need amendment or substitution. It seems unlikely, 
however, that any substitute would or should abandon the major hallmark of Section 
513(i)—the recognition that pure sponsorship acknowledgement can be exempt from 
the UBIT even if it is part of an overtly commercial transaction. Rather, a realistic 
substitute should aim at constraining the natural drift into advertising more effectively. 
Is a more stable safe-harbor rule possible within the above parameters? We should 
first consider the rule proposed by the IRS in the 1993 Regulations, based on the 
FCC’s rules. The problem with this attempt was the very aspect that made it acceptable 
to sophisticated charities. The distinction between “merely” acknowledging the 
sponsor and its products and services, on the one hand, and promoting them, on the 
other hand, is no less ambiguous than the distinction between advertising and 
sponsorship. The IRS sought to protect itself from fighting over difficult cases by 
scaring charities away from them with the tainting rule. This in terrorem strategy is 
justifiably less attractive to taxpayers and therefore more politically risky than a safe-
harbor strategy. A true safe harbor keeps planners within acceptable bounds by 
promising safety, not by threatening danger. 
Accordingly, the key to designing a more realistic safe-harbor rule is to accept that, 
in granting taxpayers a realm of clear safety, it will necessarily and somewhat 
arbitrarily abandon some meritorious claims. The need to benefit both the government 
and the taxpayer leads to two opposing requirements for an effective safe-harbor rule. 
First, most conduct within the bright line should be clearly “safe” even under a facts-
and-circumstances analysis. This requirement assures that the government does not 
give up too much to secure certainty and convenience of application. In a sponsorship 
rule, sponsorship should clearly predominate over advertising in most arrangements 
within the bright line. Second, the bright line should include most of the conduct that 
good faith taxpayers think is (or should be) “safe” under the facts-and-circumstances 
test. This requirement assures that planners will find enough opportunities within the 
rule to make the certainty it offers tempting. In a sponsorship rule, a good portion of 
mainstream sponsorship practice must be included. 
The first requirement involves devising rules that exempt little conduct that would 
otherwise be taxable. The conceptual distinction between advertising and 
acknowledgement suggests some useful rules that would not trouble a business chiefly 
interested in a charitable halo, but would be unacceptable to a business mainly 
                                                                                                                 
 
 180. For commentators taking this position, see supra note 4. 
 181. See supra notes 162–163 and accompanying text. 
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interested in renting a billboard. A combination of such rules could produce a fairly 
good proxy for arrangements in which sponsorship clearly predominates. Some 
examples follow. 
None of these examples should be taken as a necessary element of an effective safe 
harbor. Nor am I suggesting that a good rule would include all of them. To the 
contrary, combining all of these restrictions would create a rule that was far too 
restrictive, sacrificing too much of the certainty and convenience of application needed 
to attract taxpayers into the harbor, in exchange for too little added political safety. My 
examples are only intended to show that fairly clear lines could be drawn to discourage 
advertisers without imposing impractical constraints on bona fide sponsors.182 Each 
example is arbitrary and can only be justified based on the probability that it will 
exclude mostly advertising and include mostly sponsorship. The examples are as 
follows: 
• Exclude any transactions in which payment was contingent on the number of people 
exposed to the message. For instance, a sponsorship payment that ratcheted up by 
$10,000 for each additional hundred thousand television viewers would not be 
safe.183 This targets the purest advertising deals by making it hard to link payment 
to exposure. 
• Require that the sponsored organization’s name and logo be at least as prominent 
as the sponsor’s name and logo in any message. For instance, the Capital One Bowl 
would not be safe unless it was renamed the “Capital One Citrus Bowl.”184 This 
precludes pure advertising. It also tends to identify messages in which sponsor 
acknowledgement is important. 
• Exclude arrangements that involve displays of the sponsor’s products. For instance, 
a bowl game would not be safe in accepting a car company sponsorship conditioned 
on the right to place its cars at the stadium entrance. Admittedly, such a rule might 
inconvenience bona fide sponsors who want to attach a halo to a particular product. 
It would arguably inconvenience many more advertisers. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 182. A number of these rules correspond to facts and circumstances highlighted in the Audit 
Guidelines. The difference between this suggestion and the Audit Guidelines is that the Audit 
Guidelines list was intended to highlight potentially significant facts for a facts-and-
circumstances determination. This had the intentional effect of increasing uncertainty for any 
transaction with a whiff of advertising about it, leaving charities guessing as to which facts or 
groups of facts might be determinative. See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text. My 
proposal is for a safe-harbor rule, which aims to increase certainty (without giving up too many 
good cases) by making a certain set of strategically chosen facts arbitrarily determinative. 
 183. Section 513(i) already imposes this rule. See I.R.C. § 513(i)(2)(B)(i). 
 184. Some prominent bowl games already do this. The game presented by The Orange Bowl 
Committee, Inc., for instance, is currently named the FedEx Orange Bowl. See The Orange 
Bowl Committee, Inc., Home Page, http://www.orangebowl.org (last visited Aug. 22, 2006). 
The Rose Bowl does not sell naming rights, merely indicating its primary sponsors prominently. 
See, e.g., PASADENA TOURNAMENT OF ROSES ASS’N, ROSE BOWL GAME: GAME DAY GUIDE 
(2006), available at http://www.tournamentofroses.com/rosebowlgame/2006_GameDayGuide. 
pdf. 
2007] TAXATION OF CHARITABLE SPONSORSHIPS 257 
 
• Exclude messages describing the sponsor’s products or services except as 
necessary to identify the sponsor’s main class of products or services.185 For 
instance, describing Capital One as “a leading credit card issuer” would be 
acceptable, but describing it as “issuer of the new Prime Lock card, guaranteeing 
you prime rate on all your balances” would not. This would not prevent a sponsor 
from associating its brand and products with the sponsored organization or event, 
but would preclude many sales promotion messages. 
• Exclude messages that include “production elements,” such as music and pictures 
(other than a depiction of the sponsor’s and the exempt organization’s respective 
names and logos). For instance, showing the Ford logo at the beginning of an hour 
of public television would be safe, but thirty seconds of footage showing a Ford 
Taurus cruising across beautiful landscapes would not. This rule, again, might 
cramp some bona fide sponsor’s options, but would not preclude association with 
the sponsored event or organization (especially if “leveraged” with separate 
advertising).186 It would pose a serious challenge, however, to advertisers who 
generally want to convey more elaborate messages. Pure advertisers do not want to 
“leverage” an ineffective ad buy with another ad buy. 
• Exclude sponsorship by particular products or services, as opposed to a business 
organization’s name. This rule would, again, inconvenience some legitimate 
sponsorships (and discriminate arbitrarily between sponsors whose name is also 
their brand and those who have separate brands), but it would restrain a large class 
of thinly-disguised sales promotion messages (e.g., “brought to you by [MOVIE 
TITLE], the new hit romantic comedy starring [STARS’ NAMES], now playing at a 
theater near you”). 
 
Could such rules meet the second requirement of clearly safeguarding a significant 
amount of current sponsorship practices? As discussed above, from the charities’ 
perspective, no safe harbor could be preferable to current law. The premise of this 
discussion, however, is that Section 513(i) is vulnerable to upset by an event that 
changes the political balance. The crucial question, then, is not whether Congress is 
likely to replace Section 513(i) with a safe harbor under current political conditions, 
but rather whether a safe harbor could be attractive if Section 513(i) became untenable. 
Put differently, would any safe-harbor rule exclude so much current nonabusive 
conduct that it would fail its basic purpose of adding a meaningful amount of certainty? 
The cynical reader may feel that the answer to this question is obvious. One look at 
the commercialism in recent bowl game sponsorships may seem proof enough that any 
safe harbor that confined itself to messages in which the acknowledgement element 
predominated would exclude so much politically and economically significant conduct 
to doom itself politically. This reaction bears further consideration. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 185. An example of this kind of restriction is the so-called identifying statement by which 
issuers of securities can announce a pending issuance without being deemed to be “conditioning 
the market” for the issuance. Among other things, such a statement can include “[a] brief 
indication of the general type of business of the issuer.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.134(a)(3). 
 186. As discussed supra note 72 and accompanying text, such leveraging is common among 
sponsors. 
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The safe harbor elements proposed above would probably have little effect on most 
bowl game sponsorships.187 Some readers may feel that, if true, this is a flaw in the 
proposal. This feeling probably stems from some combination of discomfort with 
exempting quid pro quo payments as “donations” and discomfort with describing 
certain exempt activities (such as college football) as “charity.” As discussed above, 
discomfort with favoring commercial sponsor acknowledgements has much less 
political validity than the doctrine on which it is based might suggest.188 Discomfort 
with the scope of the exemption, by contrast, is a matter of taste.189 Those who feel it, 
however, should understand that the UBIT’s principal political function is to foreclose 
such fundamental thinking about who gets the charitable exemption subsidy and why. It 
seems unlikely that Congress or many charities would want to open such a discussion. 
Accordingly, a rule that allows sponsors to share in the popular glow of college sports 
cannot be dismissed as an inappropriate result under existing law. 
The main group of exempt organizations toeing the line of the current dangerous 
harbor seems to be those whose exempt activities involve the production of traditional 
advertising media, principally public broadcasters and operators of popular nonprofit 
websites.190 Clearly these organizations could live within a more restrictive safe-harbor 
rule (or take risks in leaving the safe harbor), but might receive considerably less 
revenue. The political question, if it arises, will be how important advertising revenue 
is to these organizations and how important these organizations are to Congress, given 
whatever circumstances precipitate change. This balance cannot be predicted; the 
position of exempt organizations will change over time, and the political context of any 
reform proposal cannot itself be predicted. 
For the reasons discussed above, I cannot give a complete blueprint for the future 
reform of Section 513(i). Nor do I advocate such reform as a matter of substantive 
policy.191 My purpose is merely to point the way toward a more stable version of the 
current solution. If, as seems possible, Section 513(i) becomes unstable in the future, it 
might help guide policymakers away from the reactive legislation that has 
characterized the UBIT since 1950. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 187. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text (describing acknowledgement of Capital 
One at Capital One Bowl). The one significant exception to this is the “equal billing” constraint 
which would preclude exclusive naming rights. 
 188. See supra notes 111–112 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra note 6. 
 190. Periodical publishers are in a similar substantive position, but are treated specially 
under the UBIT. As discussed supra notes 102–107 and accompanying text, Congress added 
Section 513(c) to the Code in 1969 specifically to tax advertising in exempt periodicals. 
Congress and the IRS recognized this special history by excluding print periodicals from 
Section 513(i) and, earlier, the 1993 Regulations. See I.R.C. § 513(i)(2)(B)(ii); 1993 
Regulations, supra note 52, at 5,690, §1.513-4(a). 
 191. In other words, I do not think advertising income raises any social issues that other 
types of exempt income do not. Nor do I think the revenue at stake is so significant as to compel 
action. I do think a true safe harbor would be superior to Section 513(i), but only because it 
would be more stable politically. 
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CONCLUSION 
The treatment of charitable sponsorships under the UBIT has often been held up as 
a glaring example of a shameful retreat by the IRS from the disinterested and 
principled application of the tax law and a prime example of interest-group tax 
legislation by Congress. There is no denying that Section 513(i) bears the marks of 
lobbyists. Focusing on that fact, however, obscures the complexity of the issue and of 
the political response to it. It assumes that the IRS’s initial position on the issue was the 
right one, simply because charities opposed it out of self-interest. It also assumes that 
commercial sponsorship arrangements and advertising are equivalent under the UBIT 
and that the self-interest of charities is consequently the only interest at stake. 
In this article, I have challenged those assumptions and tried to show why the 
distinction between advertising and sponsorship is important to understanding the 
problem, the solution we have reached, and the potential instability of that solution. 
Unlike participants in the controversy and past commentators, my analysis does not 
end with parsing technical elements of the UBIT. Rather, it examines the economic 
realities and political intuitions that eventually lead to Section 513(i). 
At the core of the problem is the distinction between advertising and sponsor 
acknowledgement. Since the early 1980s, marketers have understood that buying a 
“halo effect”—the right to associate one’s brand with the goodwill of a popular 
organization or event (sponsorship) is both commercially valuable and fundamentally 
different from buying the “billboard effect” of simple visibility (advertising). They 
have also understood the natural tendency of these two different services to mix into an 
interrelated whole. 
In the context of the exemption and the UBIT, this distinction is politically crucial. 
Charitable sponsorship is a close analogue to genuine charitable donation and is 
therefore closely aligned with the political impulse behind the charitable exemption’s 
blanket subsidy of exempt activities. Advertising, like other unrelated business 
activities, does not match the perception of the kind of activities subsidized and is 
therefore well within the political impulse that discourages such activities by taxation 
under the UBIT. 
Tax policymakers and commentators have long felt but not understood this 
distinction. Traditionally, they have tended to focus on the distinction between 
commercial and noncommercial transactions to distinguish between arrangements that 
looked like donations and arrangements that looked like an unrelated business. As 
marketers began to view sponsorships in commercial terms during the 1980s, however, 
the unreality of this distinction, as applied to business sponsorships, became apparent. 
This flawed understanding of the problem presented by sponsorships drove the 
fluctuating actions of the IRS and Congress from 1991 to 1997. The IRS’s initial 
instinct that it should tax all commercial sponsorships immediately brought out a 
reality the IRS had missed—that most business sponsorships were commercially 
driven, but that the symbolic politics of the exemption favored them, even as it 
disfavored advertising sales by charities. Accordingly, the IRS quickly shifted to 
proposing regulations based on the distinction between advertising and sponsorship. 
At the same time, Congress underwent the opposite transformation. It started from a 
simple desire to appease college football and the Olympics and passed a narrow 
exemption for their advertising revenues. After that bill was vetoed, however, later 
bills, including eventually the 1997 law that enacted Section 513(i), followed the IRS’s 
lead in maintaining the appearance of taxing advertising. Section 513(i) retains the 
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symbolism of a tax on advertising, but not the reality. Charities eagerly pushing toward 
the lucrative advertising end of the continuum between sponsorship and advertising did 
not want a safe harbor that would allow them to conduct commercial sponsorships in 
peace. They wanted an exemption for most advertising and they got it. The symbolism 
of a tax on advertising income, however, was still important enough that Congress 
retained it and the charities concurred, despite the cost and inconvenience to them. 
The question raised by Section 513(i) is not whether it is technically in keeping with 
the UBIT. That is the wrong question because the UBIT, at its core, is not about 
technical revenue issues, but rather the political perceptions that support the charitable 
exemption. Rather, the question is whether Section 513(i) will be politically stable in 
the long term if it encourages charities to engage in business activities that do not 
match those political perceptions. It was that disconnect between the perception and 
reality of charities’ activities that brought about the UBIT in the first place, as well as 
its expansion to tax advertising in 1969. Section 513(i) encourages charities into 
activities that could trigger similar political forces. The exact political event that could 
disturb the status quo is hard to anticipate, just as the rainstorm that dislodges a boulder 
at the top of the hill cannot be predicted with certainty. The direction of the roll, 
however, is predetermined. 
